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I. INTRODUCTION
NE of the fundamental decisions a corporate practitioner must
make when organizing a corporation is that of the jurisdiction of
incorporation. The ramifications of this decision will have far-
reaching implications for both the client and the corporation as transac-
tions are considered and carried out over the life of the corporation. The
decision on the jurisdiction of incorporation, however, is often given little
thought. Many practitioners choose Delaware on instinct, based on non-
quantifiable concepts such as the existence of a wider body of case law
interpreting corporation law and a judiciary that is perceived to be more
sophisticated in corporation law matters. Others choose Delaware due to
inertia, based on prior experience in Delaware or investment banker ad-
vice that everybody does it.
The Texas Legislature over the past fifteen years has sought to address
the Delaware bias by improving the corporation laws of the State and
establishing clear statutory answers to questions that have historically
been addressed in Delaware by case law. Although Delaware has at-
tempted to follow suit in certain areas by providing corporations with
greater flexibility in structuring business combinations and establishing
their capital structures, many areas continue to be left to the Delaware
courts. The Delaware courts have in turn tended to establish legal princi-
ples that often create more questions than they resolve. Often this leaves
counsel unable to give clear advice as to how transactions may be struc-
tured and allows Delaware judges to second guess the business judgment
of Texas-based corporations. Accordingly, it is now time for practitioners
to shed their historical notions of Delaware as the most desirable jurisdic-
tion for incorporation and to seriously consider the differences between
Texas and Delaware law on corporation law issues. The results of such an
inquiry may be surprising.
The resurgence of Texas as a desirable jurisdiction in which to incorpo-
rate was not merely an accident of nature. Rather, it was the product of a
concerted effort by the Texas Legislature and the corporate bar to revise
the Texas Business Corporation Act1 (the "TBCA") to better operate in
an ever-expanding global economy where the ability of corporations to
react quickly, innovatively, and with certainty is necessary to effectively
1. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 1.01(A) (Vernon 2001).
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compete and survive.2
Among the changes that have been enacted to the TBCA in recent
years are:
(i) an expansion of the director and officer indemnification provi-
sions of the TBCA to permit and accommodate alternative and
unique forms of indemnification arrangements;
(ii) the adoption of a statute that allows for the limitation of liability
of directors for actions that do not constitute violations of law or
breaches of the duty of loyalty;
(iii) an expansion of the type of information directors and officers
may rely upon in performing their duties;
(iv) a complete revision of the merger provisions of the TBCA to
permit corporations a nearly unlimited range of choices and means
for effecting acquisitive, divestitive, and restructuring transactions;
(v) the authorization of broad forms of shareholder agreements that
allow for modification to traditional statutory management and
shareholder matters;
(vi) the creation of a clear procedure for the handling of derivative
lawsuits;
(vii) an update and clarification of the rights and obligations of
shareholders; and
(viii) a simplification of the distribution provisions.3
The common thread running through these and other changes made to
the TBCA has been a fundamental desire by the drafters to create a more
practical statute. The changes seek to provide certainty as well as flexibil-
ity for corporations in arranging their capital structures, effecting transac-
tions, attracting qualified management, and other decisions. Many of the
statutory concepts adopted in Texas do not exist in Delaware or are mate-
rially more restrictive in Delaware than in Texas.
The road to the current TBCA has not always been smooth and has
been paved with battles over issues such as the scope and nature of direc-
tor liability and when shareholders should and should not be held liable
for the obligations of their corporations. 4 Texas has also had to overcome
the adverse publicity and misimpressions that were created in the wake of
the Texaco/Pennzoil case,5 which, other than having been filed in a Texas
court, had very little to do with the corporation or other laws of the State
of Texas. In fact, both Texaco and Pennzoil were Delaware corporations,
2. See Alan Bromberg et al., The Role of the Business Law Section and the Texas
Business Law Foundation in the Development of Texas Business Law, 31 BULLETIN OF Bus.
L. SECION OF THE STATE BAR OF TEX. 1 (June 1994).
3. See Byron F. Egan & Amanda M. French, 1987 Amendments to the Texas Business
Corporation Act and Other Texas Corporation Laws, 25 BULLETIN OF Bus. LAW SECTION
OF THE STATE BAR OF TEX. 1 (Sept. 1987); see also Bromberg, supra note 2, at 1; Curtis W.
Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation-Texas Versus Delaware: Is it Now Time To Rethink
Traditional Notions, 31 BULLETIN OF Bus. LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF TEX. 9
(Dec. 1994).
4. See, generally, Robert W. Hamilton, A New Turn in Texas Law of "Piercing the
Corporate Veil", 8 CORP. COUNS. REV. 2, 16-22 (1989).
5. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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and the case turned on New York law. The result could have occurred in
any jurisdiction where a jury system exists.
The Texas Legislature has offset these effects by striving to resolve va-
rious corporate legal issues by statute rather than in the courts. For ex-
ample, Texas has adopted a viable and successful tort reform system
while the Delaware courts tend to create legal theories that are depen-
dent on relatively uncertain and fact-specific standards of conduct. Thus,
the historical Delaware approach of relying on judicial interpretation to
resolve many issues has in recent years created more uncertainties than it
has resolved.
Although the process of molding the TBCA into a modern and flexible
statute is an ongoing process, the efforts of Texas to create a friendly
environment for businesses has been successful. Today, while Texas may
not have as expansive a body of case law on corporation law issues as
Delaware's nor, arguably, as sophisticated a judiciary on such issues,
Texas corporations enjoy many advantages over their Delaware counter-
parts. Those advantages are provided through a combination of a statu-
tory philosophy of providing corporations with maximum flexibility and a
clearer and more precise statute that obviates the need for case law to
interpret the ambiguities existing under the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law ("DGCL"). 6 Whether the changes to the TBCA will result in
any increase in the number of incorporations in Texas is yet to be seen.
However, the TBCA has come of age and become a model for other ju-
risdictions in how to provide a flexible statute for our changing economy
as we move forward in the 21st Century.
The TBCA, however, cannot be viewed as a corporate panacea. Off-
setting the benefits of the changes that have been made to the Texas cor-
poration laws is the impact of Texas' franchise tax laws that in effect
impose an income tax on businesses incorporated in Texas. There are,
however, tax strategies that can be used to minimize the franchise tax
impact.
II. RELATIVE TAX BURDENS
A. IMPORTANCE OF WHERE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED
To compare the relative tax burdens associated with being incorporated
in Texas and Delaware, assumptions must be made about where the cor-
poration's business operations will be conducted and sales will be made.
If operations are physically located in the state of incorporation, the com-
parative tax burdens will be different than if the operations are located in
other states. The comparisons below only address franchise and income
taxes. They do not include sales, property, severance, fuel, or other simi-
lar taxes.
6. See generally Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation supra note 3; see also, Brom-
berg, supra note 2.
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1. Texas Franchise Tax
Texas has a franchise tax that applies to corporations that are either
incorporated under the TBCA or qualified to do business in Texas as a
foreign corporation. The Texas franchise tax is the greater of a 4.5% in-
come tax or a .25% tax on net worth, with both calculations apportioned
to Texas based on a ratio of gross receipts in Texas divided by total gross
receipts. 7 Dividends received by Texas corporations from corporations
incorporated under the laws of other states are not Texas-sourced income
for franchise taxes even if the payor is qualified to do business in Texas
and pays Texas franchise taxes.8
2. Delaware Income and Franchise Taxes
Delaware has (i) an 8.7% income tax apportioned to Delaware using a
three-factor apportionment formula (equally weighted payroll, property,
and sales tax), 9 and (ii) a franchise tax based on authorized shares or
assets, whichever is less. 10 The Delaware income tax exempts corpora-
tions that have a statutory office in the state but do not conduct any busi-
ness in Delaware.
The Delaware franchise tax calculation is based on either the number
of authorized shares or adjusted gross assets, and is quite complex. The
tax is the lesser of
7. The Texas franchise tax for both domestic and foreign corporations is equal to the
greater of (i) 0.25% of its "taxable capital" (generally owners' equity or net worth) or (ii)
4.5% of its "net taxable earned surplus." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002 (Vernon 1992).
"Net taxable earned surplus" is computed by determining the entity's reportable federal
taxable income, adding to that amount the compensation of officers and directors (unless
the corporation has not more than 35 shareholders or is an S corporation for federal tax
purposes, in which case the add-back is not required), making certain other adjustments,
and then apportioning the adjusted amount to Texas based on the percentage of its gross
receipts from Texas sources. Any sales shipped from Texas into other states where such
corporation is not subject to state income tax will be "thrown back" into Texas gross re-
ceipts for purposes of the Texas apportionment formula. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1032(a)(1) (West 2000); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(37)(I) (West 2000). Al-
though labeled a "franchise tax," the tax on "net taxable earned surplus" is really a 4.5%
income tax levied at the entity level.
Limited and general partnerships (including registered limited liability partnerships) are
not presently subject to the Texas franchise tax, but there were legislative proposals to
subject them to the franchise tax or some other measure of tax on their income during the
75th Session of the Texas Legislature in 1997. See H.B. 4 introduced in January 1997,
which ultimately did not pass. The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts has issued pri-
vate letter rulings stating that it will honor the state law classification of an entity as a
partnership, despite any "check-the-box" election by the partnership to be treated as a
corporation for federal income tax purposes. See Comptroller Taxpayer Response Letter
Accession No. 9811328L (Nov. 30, 1998).
8. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(13)(C) (West 2000). There is no consolidation
for Texas franchise taxes as there is for federal income taxes. Id. § 3.544(c).
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902 (1994). The Delaware income tax apportionment
formula is [.33 x Delaware sales/aggregate sales + .33 x Delaware property/aggregate prop-
erty + .33 x Delaware payroll/aggregate payroll]. Delaware does not have a "throwback"
rule applicable to sales shipped into other states.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 503 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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(a) approximately $50 for each 10,000 authorized shares (regardless of
par value). For example, if there are 1,000,000 shares authorized, this
calculation would result in a tax of $5,000 (.005 per authorized share); or
(b) a tax on "assumed par value capital" calculated as follows:
gross assets1 divided by issued shares equals assumed par value
(i) if assumed par value is greater than stated par value, then assumed
par value times total authorized shares equals assumed par value capital.
In this scenario, the tax would equal assumed par value capital divided by
1,000,000 (rounded up to next whole number) times $200
(ii) if assumed par value is less than stated par value, then actual par
value times total authorized shares equals par value capital, and the tax
would equal par value capital divided by 1,000,000 (rounded up to the
next whole number) times $200.
B. TAX IF OPERATIONS ARE IN TEXAS
If the corporation will have its physical operations in Texas, then the
following comparison of tax burdens applies.
1. Texas Corporations
If the corporation is incorporated in Texas, its annual tax burden will
include Texas franchise tax at 4.5% of net income or .25% of net worth,
whichever is greater, apportioned to Texas based on gross receipts.
2. Delaware Corporations
If the corporation is incorporated in Delaware (again with its physical
operations in Texas), it will have to qualify to do business in Texas as a
foreign corporation ($750 one-time fee), 12 and its annual tax burden will
include:
(a) Texas franchise tax at 4.5% of net income or .25% of net worth,
whichever is greater, apportioned to Texas based on gross receipts.13
(b) Assuming the corporation does not conduct any business in Dela-
ware, it will be exempt from the Delaware income tax.
(c) Delaware franchise tax, which generally results in a tax of .02% of
"assumed par value capital."
C. TAX IF OPERATIONS ARE IN DELAWARE
If the corporation will have its physical operations in Delaware, then the
following comparison of tax burdens applies.
11. The total gross assets means all assets of the corporation net only of allowances for
bad debts, accumulated depreciation, accumulated depreciation, accumulated amortization
of land and accumulated amortization of land and accumulated amortization of intangible
assets. See also Schedule L of the federal Form 1120.
12. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr AN. art. 10.01(A)(4) (West 2001).
13. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 172.001 (West 2000).
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1. Delaware Corporations
If the corporation is incorporated in Delaware (and has its physical op-
erations in Delaware), its tax burden will include:
(a) The Delaware income tax will be 8.7% of federal taxable income
apportioned to Delaware. Delaware does not have a "throwback" rule
applicable to sales shipped into other states.
(b) Delaware franchise tax, which generally results in a tax of .02% of
"assumed par value capital."
2. Texas Corporations
If the corporation is incorporated in Texas, its tax burden will include:
(a) If there is no activity in Texas other than holding the Texas charter,
a Texas franchise tax of .25% of net worth will be apportioned to Texas
based on gross receipts.14
(b) The Delaware income tax will be 8.7% of federal taxable income
apportioned to Delaware.
(c) Delaware franchise tax, which generally results in a tax of .02% of
"assumed par value capital."
D. INTERNAL PARTNERSHIPS STILL WORK
Many Texas-based corporations (whether or not incorporated in Texas)
have utilized internal limited partnerships to isolate liabilities and reduce
franchise taxes. Because the Texas franchise/income tax is based upon
federal taxable income (computed on a separate company basis, for there
is no consolidation for Texas franchise tax purposes), the corporate part-
ner would be subject to franchise taxes to the extent that its distributive
share of the partnership's income (whether or not distributed) is Texas
sourced.15
If the limited partnership is structured such that the Texas parent is a
1% general partner and the 99% limited partner is incorporated in a state
without an income tax (assume Nevada) and does not otherwise do busi-
ness or pay franchise taxes in Texas (the ownership of a limited partner
interest in a limited partnership doing business in Texas does not alone
require the Nevada corporate limited partner to qualify in Texas as a for-
eign corporation or to pay Texas franchise taxes on its distributive share
of the partnership's income),' 6 the income attributable to the 99% lim-
ited partnership interest will not be subject to the Texas franchise/income
14. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.554 (b) (result forced by federal Public Law 86-272);
but cf Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, writ
granted).
15. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.544(c) (West 2000).
16. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(c)(12)(B) (West 2000); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9911323L (Nov. 2, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9904593L (Apr. 22, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9903584L
(Mar. 24, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9903710L (Mar. 24, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9812313L (Dec. 1,
1998); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9710257L (Oct. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9610805L (Oct. 1, 1996); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9412302L (Dec. 22, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9503L140SG09 (Mar. 20, 1995).
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tax.1 7 If the Nevada subsidiary subsequently dividends the income from
the limited partnership to its Texas parent, that dividend income will not
be subject to the Texas franchise/income tax, either because the dividend
is deducted in arriving at federal taxable income or it is a non-Texas re-
ceipt for franchise tax purposes. 18 The foregoing is a simplification of a
common internal limited partnership structure. The actual analysis, of
course, becomes very fact specific and there are a number of structural
variations available depending upon the objectives and the source of the
income.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The tax burdens are dependent on the substantive nature and circum-
stances of the new corporation to be formed. The generalizations that
can be drawn include:
(1) If the physical operations and sales will be in Texas, there is no tax
advantage to forming the corporation in Delaware.
(2) If the physical operations and sales will be in Delaware, there is no
tax advantage to forming the corporation in Texas.
(3) If the corporation will have substantial sales of products through-
out the United States or abroad, the foregoing conclusions will have to be
tested in the numerical/geographical profile of the particular corporation,
particularly where the corporation is subject to the tax laws of multiple
jurisdictions.
Further, the use of internal partnerships and foreign subsidiaries can
reduce the Texas franchise tax burden such that there is no tax advantage
for the parent company to be incorporated in Delaware.
III. JUDICIARY
A. DELAWARE
The Delaware Court of Chancery is the forum for resolution of internal
corporate governance disputes, contests for corporate control, and similar
matters in Delaware. The expertise of the Court of Chancery and the
body of Delaware case law are frequently cited as reasons for Delaware
being a preferred state for incorporation.' 9 This judicial sword has two
edges.
The Court of Chancery is a court of general equity jurisdiction and
does not have jurisdiction over criminal cases or tort actions seeking dam-
ages, which tend to crowd the dockets of law courts. As a result, the
Court of Chancery often can deal with cases expeditiously when the cir-
cumstances so require, which may not be an advantage depending upon
17. Id.
18. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(13)(A) (West 2000).
19. See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven For Incorporation? 20
DEL. J. CORP. L. 965 (1995); LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELA-
WARE (1993).
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one's posture in a case.20
The Delaware Court of Chancery presently consists of one chancellor
and four vice chancellors, each appointed by the Governor and subject to
Senate confirmation, for a twelve-year term.21 These judges see a volume
of cases and have developed specialized expertise, a willingness to be-
come judicially involved in corporate disputes, and some distinct ideas as
to how corporations should be governed, which often proves discom-
forting to management and the attorneys who represent the management
perspective. Delaware also has a developed corporate plaintiffs' bar,
which is comfortable with the Court of Chancery.
Because it is a court of equity, trials in the Court of Chancery are to the
court rather than a jury. So long as a matter is properly within the equita-
ble subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, equity may pro-
ceed to determine all facts essential to a decree, and there is no right,
constitutional or otherwise, to have factual issues tried before a jury.22
The Delaware Legislature has enacted legislation giving the Court of
Chancery statutory authority over a broad spectrum of intracorporate is-
sues, including actions relating to director and officer indemnification, 23
suits concerning the replacement of lost stock certificates, 24 actions to
compel the holding of annual stockholders meetings, 25 proceedings to re-
quire the production of corporate records for stockholder inspection,26
judicial review of elections of directors and other stockholder actions, 27
cases seeking a court appraisal of the fair value of corporate stock,28 and
a variety of proceedings relating to corporate dissolution and
insolvency. 29
The concepts of fiduciary rights and duties arose as creation of equity
in response to perceived inadequacies in the common law, and the con-
struction and enforcement thereof now lie within the exclusive province
of the Court of Chancery.30 The existence of a fiduciary relationship con-
fers upon the Court of Chancery jurisdiction to hear and determine all
relevant controversies existing between the parties, although there may
exist some other cause of action at law. Equitable jurisdiction exists even
if the remedy sought is an award of money damages, since the source of
20. See generally DONALD J. WOLFE & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY (1998).
21. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 3 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 307 (1999)
(adding three vice chancellors by statute to the chancellor and vice chancellor required by
the state's constitution).
22. See WOLFE & PITrENGER, supra note 20.
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
24. See id. § 168.
25. See id. § 211.
26. See id. § 220.
27. See id. § 225.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262.
29. See id. §§ 273, 280, 284, 291.
30. See McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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jurisdiction is the substantive equitable right itself.31
Cases within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
may involve both legal and equitable claims.32 The Court of Chancery
generally lacks the power to impose penalties or forfeitures, including pu-
nitive or exemplary damages. 33
Under Delaware law, nonresident directors of Delaware corporations
are subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware courts based on their ac-
tivities as directors. Under DGCL § 325, 34 actions may be brought
against officers, directors, or stockholders of Delaware corporations
when they are "liable by the provisions of this chapter to pay the debts of
the corporation." However, an action under DGCL § 325 may not be
brought against any officer, director or stockholder for any such debt
"until judgment be obtained therefor against the corporation."
Under Delaware's director consent statute,35 a court may exercise ju-
risdiction over a director or former director of a Delaware corporation
for claims of breach of directors' duties, based upon his implied consent
to substituted service of process. 36 The statute does not apply to nonresi-
dent directors who die before suit or service of process is commenced. 37
If § 3114 does not apply, Delaware's long-arm statute 38 would confer
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant as long as the defen-
dant has engaged in any one of a list of enumerated acts, including: en-
gaging in contracts, causing tortious injury, having or possessing real
property in Delaware, and transacting business or performing work in
Delaware. 39 This provision also confers jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant for claims relating to the act of incorporation, provided there is
some nexus between the act giving rise to jurisdiction (the act of incorpo-
rating) and the plaintiff's claim.40 The Delaware statute confers jurisdic-
tion as of the time the alleged wrongful action occurred and does not
require that the defendant be in office at the time process is served.41
31. See Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 500 (Del. 1982); Bird v. Lida,
Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 402 (Del. Ch. 1996); McMahon, 532 A.2d at 604.
32. See Wilmont Homes, Inc. v. Weiler, 202 A.2d 576, 580 (Del. Ch. 1964).
33. See Beals v. Wash. Int'l, Inc., 386 A.2d 1156, 1159 (Del. Ch. 1978).
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1999).
35. Id.
36. See id. tit. 10, § 3114(a); Carlton Inv. v. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 13950, 1995 WL 694397, at * 7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1995); Tabas v. Crosby, 444 A.2d 250,
252-53 (Del. Ch. 1982) (a director, by accepting election or appointment as a director of a
Delaware corporation, is deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction being obtained
in suits which relate to acts as a director).
37. See Tabas, 444 A.2d at 252-53 (Section 3114 does not provide for substituted ser-
vice upon the decedent's personal representative).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (1999).
39. See id.
40. See Mobilificio San Giacomo S.P.A. v. Stoffi, No. 96-415-LON, 1996 WL 924508,
at *3, *10 (D. Del. Oct. 29, 1996) (citations omitted) (holding that because there was no
allegation that the act of incorporating in any way harmed the plaintiff, the nexus was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant).
41. WOLFE & PIrrENGER, supra note 20, at 134.
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B. TEXAS
Corporate disputes in Texas are handled in law courts of general juris-
diction just as other civil cases. Judges are elected. Questions of fact are
subject to trial by jury.
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES GENERALLY
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The concepts that underlie the fiduciary duties of corporate directors
have their origins in English common law of trusts and agency from over
two hundred years ago. 42 The current concepts of those duties in both
Texas and Delaware are still largely matters of evolving common law.
Both the TBCA and the DGCL provide that the business and affairs of
a corporation are to be managed under the direction of its board of direc-
tors.43 While the TBCA and the DGCL provide statutory guidance as to
matters such as the issuance of securities, the payment of dividends, the
conduct of meetings of directors and shareholders, and the ability of di-
rectors to rely on specified persons and information, the nature of a direc-
tor's "fiduciary" duty to the corporation and the shareholders has been
largely defined by the courts through damage and injunctive actions. In
Texas, the fiduciary duty of a director has been characterized as including
duties of loyalty, care and obedience.4 4 In Delaware, the fiduciary duties
include those loyalty, care, and candor.45 Both Texas and Delaware have
adopted a judicial rule of review for the business decisions, known as the
"business judgment rule," that is intended to protect disinterested direc-
tors from liability for decisions made by them when exercising their busi-
ness judgment, but there are substantial differences between the
Delaware and Texas judicial approaches to the business judgment rule.
B. APPLICABLE LAW
Under the internal affairs doctrine, courts in Texas apply the law of a
corporation's state of incorporation in adjudications regarding director
fiduciary duties. 46 Delaware also subscribes to the internal affairs doc-
trine. However, Delaware has enacted a choice of law statute under
which the parties can agree that internal matters ordinarily governed by
the law of the state of incorporation will be resolved under the laws of
42. Henry R. Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judg-
ment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 973 (1994).
43. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.31 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000), DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
44. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984).
45. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-73 (Del. 1985).
46. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 8.02; (Vernon Supp. 2001); Misc. CORP. LAWS
AcT ("TMCLA") art. 1302-1.03 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460 (5th Cir.
2000); see also Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719; A. Copeland Enter., Inc. v. Guste, 706 F. Supp.
1283, 1288 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Delaware in Delaware courts.47
C. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN TEXAS CASES
The Fifth Circuit stated in Gearhart that under Texas law "[t]hree
broad duties stem from the fiduciary status of corporate directors;
namely, the duties of obedience, loyalty, and due care," 48 and commented
that (i) the duty of obedience requires a director to avoid committing
ultra vires acts, i.e., acts beyond the scope of the authority of the corpora-
tion as defined by its articles of incorporation or the laws of the state of
incorporation, (ii) the duty of loyalty dictates that a director must act in
good faith and must not allow his personal interests to prevail over the
interests of the corporation, and (iii) the duty of due care requires that a
director must handle his corporate duties with such care as an ordinarily
prudent man would use under similar circumstances. 49 Gearhart remains
the seminal case for defining the fiduciary duties of directors in Texas,
although there are subsequent cases which amplify Gearhart as they ap-
ply it in particular situations, such as lawsuits by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Resolution Trust Company
("RTC") arising out of failed financial institutions.50
1. Loyalty
The duty of loyalty in Texas is a duty that dictates that the director act
in good faith and not allow his personal interest to prevail over that of the
corporation.5 1 The good faith of a director will be determined on
whether the director acted with an intent to confer a benefit to the corpo-
ration.52 Whether there exists a personal interest by the director will be a
question of fact.53 In general, a director will not be permitted to derive a
personal profit or advantage at the expense of the corporation and must
act solely with an eye to the best interest of the corporation, unhampered
by any pecuniary interest of his own.54
The court in Gearhart summarized Texas law with respect to the ques-
tion of whether a director is interested:
A director is considered 'interested' if he or she (1) makes a personal
profit from a transaction by dealing with the corporation or usurps a
corporate opportunity ...(2) buys or sells assets of the corpora-
tion... (3) transacts business in his director's capacity with a second
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers,
and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999 (1994).
48. Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719.
49. See id. at 712-20; see also McCollum v. Dollar, 213 S.W. 259 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1919, holding approved).
50. See, e.g., FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
51. See Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719.
52. See Int'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
53. See id. at 578.
54. See Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Guste, 706 F. Supp. 1283, 1291; Milam v. Cooper Co.,
258 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally John T.
Kendrick, Jr., The Interested Director in Texas, 21 Sw. L.J. 794 (1967).
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corporation of which he is also a director or significantly financially
associated ... or (4) transacts business in his director's capacity with
a family member. 55
2. Care
The duty of care in Texas requires the director to handle his duties with
such care as an ordinarily prudent man would use under similar circum-
stances. In performing this obligation, the director must be diligent and
informed and exercise honest and unbiased business judgment in pursuit
of corporate interests.56
In general, the duty of care will be satisfied if the directors' actions are
covered by the business judgment rule. The Fifth Circuit stated in Gear-
hart that, in spite of the requirement that a corporate director handle his
duties with such care as an ordinarily prudent man would use under simi-
lar circumstances, Texas courts will not impose liability upon a noninter-
ested corporate director unless the challenged action is ultra vires or is
tainted by fraud. In a footnote in the Gearhart decision, the Fifth Circuit
stated:
The business judgment rule is a defense to the duty of care. As such,
the Texas business judgment rule precludes judicial interference with
the business judgment of directors absent a showing of fraud or an
ultra vires act. If such a showing is not made, then the good or bad
faith of the directors is irrelevant. 57
In applying the business judgment rule in Texas, the courts have quoted
from the early Texas decision of Cates v. Sparkman,58 as setting the stan-
dard for judicial intervention in cases involving duty of care issues:
[I]f the acts or things are or may be that which the majority of the
company have a right to do, or if they have been done irregularly,
negligently, or imprudently, or are within the exercise of their discre-
tion and judgment in the development or prosecution of the enter-
prise in which their interests are involved, these would not constitute
such a breach of duty, however unwise or inexpedient such acts
might be, as would authorize interference by the courts at the suit of
a stockholder.59
In Gearhart the Court commented that "[elven though Cates was de-
cided in 1889, and despite the ordinary care standard announced in Mc-
Collum v. Dollar, Texas courts to this day will not impose liability upon a
noninterested corporate director unless the challenged action is ultra
vires or is tainted by fraud."'60
Neither Gearhart nor the earlier Texas cases on which it relied referred
to "gross negligence" as a standard for director liability. If read literally,
55. Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719-20 (citations omitted).
56. See id. at 719; see also McCollum, 213 S.W. at 261.
57. Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 723 n.9.
58. 11 S.W. 846 (1889).
59. Id. at 849.
60. Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 721.
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the business judgment rule articulated in Gearhart would protect even
grossly negligent conduct. Recent federal district court decisions in FDIC
and RTC initiated cases, however, have declined to interpret Texas law
this broadly and have held that the Texas business judgment rule does not
protect "any breach of the duty of care that amounts to gross negligence"
or "directors who abdicate their responsibilities and fail to exercise any
judgment."61
In response to RTC and FDIC claims that ordinary negligence was the
standard for duty of care cases against failed Texas financial institutions,
the Texas legislature in 1993 passed House Bill 107662 which, purporting
not to change existing law, provided that a disinterested director of a
failed institution may not be held personally liable unless the director was
grossly negligent or committed willful or negligent misconduct.63 While
House Bill 1076 is inapplicable beyond FDIC and RTC cases, its legisla-
tive imprimatur "gave added weight to the Gearhart standard of liability"
because the "statute explicitly provides that officers and directors may be
held liable only for acts of gross negligence" and "was not intended to
change, but merely clarify, existing law regarding the proper standard of
care for directors and officers of insured financial institutions. ' 64 The
RTC challenged the constitutionality of House Bill 1076 in Harrington,
but the court resolved the issues before it without reaching the constitu-
tional question.
Gross negligence in Texas is defined as "that entire want of care which
would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the
result of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person or
persons to be affected by it."' 65 In Harrington,66 the Court concluded
"that a director's total abdication of duties falls within this definition of
gross negligence."
The business judgment rule does not necessarily protect a director with
respect to transactions in which he is interested. It simply means that the
action will have to be challenged on duty of loyalty rather than duty of
care grounds. 67
Directors may "in good faith and with ordinary care, rely on informa-
tion, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and
other financial data," prepared by officers or employees of the corpora-
61. FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 306 (N.D. Tex. 1994); see also RTC v. Ac-
ton, 844 F. Supp, 307, 314 (N.D. Tex. 1994); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 357 (S.D. Tex.
1993); FDIC v. Brown, 812 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1992). Cf. RTC v. Miramon, 22
F.3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994) (followed Harrington analysis of § 1821(K) of the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), which held that federal
common law of director liability did not survive FIRREA and applied Texas' gross negli-
gence standard for financial institution director liability cases under FIRREA).
62. Harrington, 84 F. Supp. at 307 n.8; see Tex. H. B. 1076, § 2, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
63. Id.
64. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. at 307, 307 n.8
65. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981).
66. FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 306 n.7 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
67. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 723, 723 n.9 (5th Cir.
1984).
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tion, counsel, accountants, investment bankers or "other persons as to
matters the director reasonably believes are within the person's profes-
sional or expert competence. '68
3. Other (Obedience)
The duty of obedience in Texas requires a director to avoid committing
ultra vires acts, i.e., acts beyond the scope of the powers of the corpora-
tion as defined by its articles of incorporation and Texas law. 69 An ultra
vires act may be voidable under Texas law, but the director will not be
held personally liable for such act unless the act is in violation of a spe-
cific statute or against public policy.
The RTC's complaint in RTC v. Norris,70 asserted that the directors of
a failed financial institution breached their fiduciary duty of obedience by
failing to cause the institution to adequately respond to regulatory warn-
ings: "The defendants committed ultra vires acts by ignoring warnings
from [regulators], by failing to put into place proper review and lending
procedures, and by ratifying loans that did not comply with state and fed-
eral regulations and Commonwealth's Bylaws."' 71 In rejecting this RTC
argument, the court wrote:
The RTC does not cite, and the court has not found, any case in
which a disinterested director has been found liable under Texas law
for alleged ultra vires acts of employees, absent pleadings and proof
that the director knew of or took part in the act, even where the act
is illegal.
Under the business judgment rule, Texas courts have refused to im-
pose personal liability on corporate directors for illegal or ultra vires
acts of corporate agents unless the directors either participated in the
act or had actual knowledge of the act.72
D. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN DELAWARE CASES
1. Loyalty
The duty of loyalty in Delaware imposes on the director an obligation
to refrain from doing anything that would effect an injury to the corpora-
tion, or deprive it of profits or advantages which the director's skill and
ability might properly bring to the corporation, or enable the corporation
to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The duty of
loyalty requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty by the director to the
corporation and demands that there not be any conflict between the di-
rector's duty to the corporation and the self-interest of the director. 73
68. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.41(D) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
69. Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719.
70. 830 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
71. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
73. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939) ("Corporate officers and directors
are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private
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The standard which must be followed by a director in complying with the
duty of loyalty will not be subject to any fixed schedule and will be de-
pendent upon the facts and circumstances. 74
2. Care
a. Duty of Care
The duty of care under Delaware law is a duty that requires the direc-
tor exercise his business judgment in the management of the corporation
with due care and good faith. In 1962, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated:
[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are
bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and pru-
dent men would use in similar circumstances. Their duties are those
of control, and whether or not by neglect they have made themselves
liable for failure to exercise proper control depends upon the circum-
stances of and facts of the particular case.75
This duty requires the director to inform himself of all material infor-
mation reasonably available to him prior to making a decision.76
b. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is premised on the fact that courts are ill
equipped to engage in substantive reviews of business decisions taken by
directors in the management of their corporations and a public policy that
encourages entrepreneurial risk taking by corporate managers without
the specter of personal liability for decisions that in hindsight prove to be
wrong or imprudent. In Delaware the business judgment rule provides
that an independent corporate director who makes a business decision on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the corporation will not be held person-
ally liable for mistakes of business judgment that damage corporate
interests.7 7
interests.., an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall
be no conflict between duty and self-interest.").
74. Id. at 514-15.
75. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1962).
76. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
77. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("a
decision made by an independent board will not give rise to liability ... if it is made in
good faith and in the exercise of due care"); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del.
2000) (evaluating charge that directors breached fiduciary duties in approving employment
and subsequent severance of Michael S. Ovitz as president of The Walt Disney Company,
and holding that the "issues of disinterestedness and independence" turn on whether the
directors were "incapable due to personal interest or domination and control, of objec-
tively evaluating" an action). Brehm followed in this respect, and overruled as to the stan-
dards for appellate review. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (addressing
approval by directors of lucrative consulting contract with founder/controlling shareholder
in his seventies that gave him a percentage of the corporation's profits above a threshold
without any requirement that he be able to work plus interest-free loans, the court found
the directors "independent" because they had no financial interest in the transactions, al-
[Vol. 54
CHOICE OF STATE OF INCORPORATION
The business judgment rule in Delaware is both a presumption (i.e., a
burden-allocating mechanism used in litigation), and a substantive rule of
law. As a presumption, the rule provides that acts by independent direc-
tors will be presumed to have been taken with due care and good faith
and in a belief that the act was in the best interest of the corporation.7s
The standard for liability under the Delaware business judgment rule is
gross negligence. 79 Thus, a challenge to an action by an independent di-
rector requires the complaining party to prove that the action by the di-
rector was grossly negligent or was not taken in an honest attempt to
foster the corporation's interests. As a substantive rule of law, the busi-
ness judgment rule provides that there is no liability to a director for au-
thorizing a corporate action if the director acted in good faith and with
appropriate care in informing himself of all material information reasona-
bly available to him under the circumstances. 80
c. Duty of Oversight
The Delaware Court of Chancery has suggested that business judgment
protection is unavailable where directors failed to act because they were
ignorant of the operative facts.8 ' In such a case, ordinary negligence
would be the standard by which the directors' conduct is measured.82
Other decisions, however, indicate that director inaction will be enti-
tled to some level of protection. The Delaware Supreme Court has made
clear that director inaction standing alone is not determinative, and "a
conscious decision to refrain from acting may none the less be a valid
exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the [business
judgment] rule."'8 3 Thus, a conscious decision not to act should be mea-
sured by the business judgment rule, with the likely result that an in-
formed decision not to act would be protected.
Because deliberate inaction is protected by the business judgment rule,
the focus in a director inaction case must be on the process by which the
though they were dependent upon the founder for their positions, and applied business
judgment rule).
78. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986) (stating that business judgment rule is "presumption that in making a business deci-
sion the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company").
79. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
80. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 ("[T]he standard for judging the informational
component of the directors' decision does not mean that the Board must be informed of
every fact. The Board is responsible for considering only material facts that are reasonably
available, not those that are immaterial or out of the board's reasonable reach." The "term
'material' is used in this context to mean relevant and of a magnitude to directors in carry-
ing out their fiduciary care in decisionmaking," which is "distinct from the use of the term
'material' in disclosure to stockholders in which [a]n omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in decid-
ing how to vote.").
81. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 522, 1987 WL 28436,
at *1 (Del. Ch.).
82. Id.
83. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813.
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decision not to act was made. In In re Caremark International, Inc. Deriv-
ative Litigation,84 the Delaware Court of Chancery approved the settle-
ment of a derivative action that involved claims that members of
Caremark's board of directors breached their fiduciary duty of care to the
company in connection with alleged violations by the company of anti-
referral provisions of Federal Medicare and Medicaid statutes. In so do-
ing, the court discussed the scope of a board of directors' duty to super-
vise or monitor corporate performance and to stay informed about the
business of the corporation as follows:
[I]t would ... be a mistake to conclude ... that corporate boards
may satisfy their obligations to be reasonably informed concerning
the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably de-
signed to provide to senior management and to the board itself
timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the
board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concern-
ing both the corporation's compliance with law and its business
performance. 85
Stated affirmatively, "a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system,
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
under some circumstances may . . . render a director liable. '86 While
Caremark recognizes a cause of action for uninformed inaction the hold-
ing is subject to the following:
First, the court held that "only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists-will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liabil-
ity."' 87 It is thus not at all clear that a plaintiff could recover based on
a single example of director inaction, or even a series of examples
relating to a single subject.
Second, Caremark noted that "the level of detail that is appropriate for
such an information system is a question of business judgment, '88 which
indicates that the presence of an existing information and reporting sys-
tem will do much to cut off any derivative claim, because the adequacy of
the system itself will be protected.
Third, Caremark considered it obvious that "no rationally designed in-
formation system . . . will remove the possibility" that losses could oc-
cur.89 As a result, "[alny action seeking recovery for losses would
logically entail a judicial determination of proximate cause. '"90 This hold-
ing indicates that a loss to the corporation is not itself evidence of an
84. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
85. Id. at 970.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 971.
88. Id. at 970.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 970 n.27.
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inadequate information and reporting system. Instead, the court will fo-
cus on the adequacy of the system overall and whether a causal link
exists. 91
Delaware has also imposed a duty of candor. The duty of candor in
Delaware is an unremitting obligation of a director to fair dealing with
the corporation.92 This duty requires disclosure to stockholders of "all
germane or material information" 93 and information that "would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix of information made available. '94 This duty requires, at a min-
imum, that a director not use superior information or knowledge to mis-
lead others in the performance of their fiduciary obligations to the
corporation, and the breach thereof can be established without any show-
ing that the directors acted with scienter. The judicial focus in the re-
ported cases has been on information related to the process followed by
the directors leading up to its decision to recommend that the sharehold-
ers approve a transaction and to the relative value to be received by the
shareholders, rather than on compliance with Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") disclosure rules.95
3. Standard of Review in Change-of-Control Context
Before the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.,96 it was believed that (in the absence of a traditional
conflict of interest) director action would be afforded the protection of
the business judgment rule which respected adequately informed business
decisions. Beginning with Unocal, however, the conduct of directors was
subjected to "enhanced scrutiny" in circumstances involving a change in
control where a traditional conflict of interest was absent. This places a
burden on directors not only to be adequately informed but also to have
"acted reasonably. '97 The range of reasonableness addressed by en-
hanced scrutiny may be a middle ground between the "any rational pur-
pose" standard deferred to under the business judgment rule and the
"entire fairness" sought for transactions in which directors or other affili-
91. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Governance The Board of Directors
and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237 (1997); Harvey L. Pitt et al., Talking the
Talk and Walking the Walk: Director Duties to Uncover and Respond to Management Mis-
conduct, 1005 PLI/CoRP. 301, 304 (1997); Richard S. Gruner, Director and Officer Liability
for Defective Compliance Systems: Caremark and Beyond, 995 PLI/CoRP. 57, 64-70 (1997);
Stephen F. Funk, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law: In re Caremark Inter-
national Inc. Derivative Litigation: Director Behavior, Shareholder Protection, and Corpo-
rate Legal Compliance, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311 (1997).
92. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., No. 10168, 1988 WL 108332 (Del. Ch.
1988), rev'd, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
93. Stroud v. Milliken Enters., Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989).
94. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987); see also Day v.
Quotron Sys., Inc., No. 8502, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 297, 306-07 (Del. Ch. 1989).
95. See generally, Donald F. Pease, Delaware's Disclosure Rule: The "Complete Can-
dor" Standard, Its Application, and Why Sue in Delaware, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 445 (1989).
96. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
97. Paramount Commun., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)
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ates have an interest.98
Enhanced scrutiny was initially the product of court review of defen-
sive techniques used to respond to an unwanted suitor.99 The burden of
enhanced scrutiny was extended to director responses to competing bids
when a decision is made to sell a company. 100 More recently, in QVC,
the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that enhanced scrutiny is applica-
ble to change in control transactions generally: "In the sale of control
context, the directors must focus on one primary objective-to secure the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the
stockholders.' 01
A merger or other business combination in which stockholders are
cashed out or one in which a stockholder or an affiliated group of stock-
holders of the corporation control the continuing entity is generally
viewed as a "sale of control" because the transaction at hand represents
the only opportunity to receive a control premium. Delaware courts have
held, however, that control is generally not affected by a "stock for stock"
merger, where as a majority of the shares in the continuing entity will
continue to be held after the merger by a "fluid aggregation of unaffili-
ated shareholders representing a voting majority.' u0 2 This type of trans-
action is not considered a change of control because the target
stockholders continue to have the opportunity to receive a control pre-
mium, even if the target stockholders will represent only a minority of the
ongoing entity.'03
4. Entire Fairness
Both the Delaware business judgment rule and the Delaware enhanced
scrutiny standard should be contrasted with the standard applied in trans-
actions with affiliates. In reviewing board action in transactions involving
management, board members, or a principal shareholder, the Delaware
Supreme Court has imposed an "entire fairness" standard.'0 4 Under this
standard the burden is on directors to show both fair dealing and a fair
price:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
98. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)).
99. See id. at 949-53; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-50 (Del.
Supr. 1985).
100. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (stating that where the directors have determined that a sale of control or breakup of
the company is "inevitable," their duty is "the maximization of the company's value at a
sale for the stockholders' benefit").
101. QVC, 637 A.2d at 44.
102. Paramount Commun., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Arnold
v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994).
103. Time, 571 A.2d at 1151.
104. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); see also Mills Acquisition
Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
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directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockhold-
ers were obtained. The later aspect of fairness relates to the eco-
nomic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including
all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects,
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock.10 5
The burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the transaction was unfair
where (i) the transaction was approved by the majority of the minority
shareholders, though the burden remains on the directors to show that
they completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction, 10 6
or (ii) the transaction was negotiated by a special committee of indepen-
dent directors that was truly independent, not coerced, and had real bar-
gaining power.' 0 7 However, application of the "entire fairness" standard
will vary from case to case:
The judgment whether a transaction satisfies the fairness test is, how-
ever, not a bifurcated one but is a single judgment that considers
each of these aspects. In some contexts price may be a relatively
minor or an inapplicable consideration. In other contexts price may
predominate as a salient consideration. Plainly in a cash-out merger,
price is a dominant concern, most especially where the buyer already
has voting control of the enterprise, such as a parent-sub merger....
But in a cash-out merger that is the second step of an arm's-length
transaction, the presumed reliance by the shareholders on the integ-
rity of the process by which the price recommended by the board
was arrived at, makes the fairness and adequacy of the process a
more significant factor in assessing overall fairness than in the par-
ent-sub merger context.108
5. Action Without Bright Lines
Whether the burden will be on the party challenging board action
under the business judgment rule or on the directors under enhanced
scrutiny, the care with which the directors acted in a change-in-control
transaction will be subjected to a close review. For this review there will
be no "bright-line" tests, and it may be assumed that the board may be
called upon to show care commensurate with the importance of the deci-
sions made, whatever they may have been in the circumstances. Thus
directors, and those advising them, are faced with the words of the QVC
court as it left other scenarios for another day:
Unsolicited tender offers in other contexts may be governed by dif-
ferent precedent. For example, where a potential sale of control by a
corporation is not the consequence of a board's action, this Court
has recognized the prerogative of a board of directors to resist a
third party's unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer. The decision
105. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
106. Id. at 703.
107. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).




of a board to resist such an acquisition, like all decisions of a prop-
erly-functioning board, must be informed, and the circumstances of
each particular case will determine the steps that a board must take
to inform itself, and what other action, if any, is required as a matter
of fiduciary duty.109
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,110 the Supreme Court of
Delaware considered a shareholder rights plan adopted not during a
takeover contest, "but as a preventive mechanism to ward off future ad-
vances.""' The court upheld the pre-planned poison pill but noted that
its ruling was not absolute. The court determined that when a board of
directors "is faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the [rights
plan], they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer. They will be
held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of directors would
be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism."' 2
E. FIDUCIARY DUTiEs/LIABILITIES OF OFFICERS
Under both Texas and Delaware law, a corporate officer owes a fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation and may be sued in a corporate derivative
action just as a director may be.113 Derivative claims against officers for
failure to exercise due care in carrying out their responsibilities as as-
signed by the board of directors are uncommon.
A corporate officer is an agent of the corporation."14 If an officer com-
mits a tort while acting for the corporation, under the law of agency, the
officer is liable personally for his actions."15 The corporation may also be
liable under respondent superior.
F. CONSEQUENCES OF BREACH
1. Equitable Relief
Many of the reported fiduciary-duty cases, particularly in the arena of
contested acquisitions, arise in the context of injunctive proceedings. Fre-
quently, the plaintiff seeks to invalidate defenses such as poison pills. 116
109. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 n.13 (citations omitted); see also Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("there is no single blueprint that a board must follow
to fulfill its duties. A stereotypical approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate con-
trol is not to be expected in the face of the evolving techniques and financing devices
employed in today's corporate environment.").
110. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
111. Id. at 1349.
112. Id. at 1354; see also Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721
A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Unitrin Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995);
Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
113. See Faour v. Faour, 789 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
114. Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 156 A. 350
(Del. Ch. 1931); Hollaway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1995).
115. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection of State Corporation Law
and Employee Compensation Programs: Is it Curtains for Veil Piercing? 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1059, 1078-1079 (1996).
116. See Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 712.
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Courts can also order judicial dissolution of a merger that has already
been consummated. 117
2. Damages
Courts can also award actual and punitive damages for breach of fidu-
ciary duty.1 8 However, there is probably some judicial reluctance to
award substantial damages where there is no selfdealing or other per-
sonal benefit on the part of the defendant directors.' 1 9
Recovery for breach of fiduciary duties owed by a director to the cor-
poration ordinarily belongs to the corporation and may be recovered
through a derivative action on behalf of the corporation.' 20 A director
does not owe fiduciary duties to an individual shareholder unless there is
some contract or special relationship with the shareholder.' 21
3. Aiders and Abettors
Any person who knowingly participates in a director's breach of fiduci-
ary duty can be personally liable to the corporation's shareholders.'22
V. STATUTORY COMPARISON
Additional important differences between Texas and Delaware corpo-
ration law lie in the corporation statutes themselves. Imbedded in the
Texas statute is an underlying public policy favoring the freedom of con-
tract and a desire to provide flexibility to corporations in managing their
internal affairs and corporate lives. The following sets forth a discussion
of certain of the major distinctions between the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act ("TBCA") and the Delaware General Corporate Law
("DGCL") unless otherwise indicated.
117. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970).
118. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893 (holding directors who voted for merger of
the corporation with an unaffiliated entity in an arms-length transaction not involving any
selfdealing personally liable for difference between amount of consideration received and
the fair value of the corporation's shares because they failed "to inform themselves of all
information reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the
[merger]").
119. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 591
(1983).
120. Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1990).
121. See Faour, 789 S.W.2d at 622, Schautteet v. Chester State Bank, 707 F. Supp. 885,
887 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
122. See Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Claims of Aiding and Abetting a Director's Breach of
Fiduciary-Does Everybody Who Deals with a Delaware Director Owe Fiduciary Duties to
that Director's Shareholders?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943 (1990).
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A. DIRECTOR DUTIES AND LIABILITIES
1. Limitation of Director Liability-Article 1302-7.06 of the TMCL
and Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL
In response to the director and officer liability insurance crisis of the
1980s and a concern about the ability of corporations to attract and retain
qualified persons willing to serve as directors in light of Van Gorkom
(holding outside directors liable for a hasty and imprudent business deci-
sion), 123 both Texas and Delaware adopted statutes expressly authorizing
corporations to limit the liability of their directors for certain matters.
The limitations permitted by the Texas and Delaware statutes are based
on long-standing fiduciary and contract principles that permit parties to
establish by contract the duties of a fiduciary subject to public policy
limitations.
The Texas limitation on director liability is set forth in article 1302-7.06
of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws (the "TMCL"). 124 A Texas
corporation may include a provision in its articles of incorporation that
eliminates or limits the liability of a director to his corporation and the
corporation's shareholders for monetary damages for any act or omission
in the director's capacity as a director except where the director is found
liable under one of the following four circumstances. Those circum-
stances are where the director is found to be liable for (i) a breach of the
director's duty of loyalty, (ii) an act or omission not in good faith that
constitutes a breach of duty of the director or an act or omission that
involves intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii) a
transaction from which the director received an improper personal bene-
fit, and (iv) an act or omission for which liability of a director is expressly
provided by an applicable statute. 25 Article 1302-7.06, through its
description of exceptions, is essentially a codification of the standard of
liability of directors articulated in Gearhart.12 6 It assures corporations
that include this provision in their articles of incorporation that the Gear-
hart standards of liability (fraud, ultra vires, and breach of duty of loyalty)
will be the applicable standard for their directors even if the standard of
liability for a director under the business judgment rule in Texas is ulti-
mately determined to be gross negligence as envisioned by Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Norris127 and FDIC v. Brown.' 28
Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL similarly provides a means for a corpo-
ration to limit the liability of a director through a provision contained in
the corporation's certificate of incorporation. 129 Like the Texas statute,
section 102(b)(7) permits the elimination or limitation of liability of a
123. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1999-2000).
125. Id. art. 1302-7.06(B).
126. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719-22 (5th Cir. 1984).
127. 830 F. Supp. 351, 357-58 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
128. 812 F. Supp. 722, 725-26 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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director for breaches of fiduciary duty except under enumerated circum-
stances: (i) a breach of a duty of loyalty, (ii) an act or omission not in
good faith or involving "intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law," (iii) certain unlawful distributions, and (iv) transactions in which
the director derived "an improper person benefit.' 130
2. Indemnification-Article 2.02-1 of the TBCA and Section 145 of the
DGCL
Both Texas and Delaware permit corporations to indemnify their direc-
tors and officers for liabilities incurred by serving as directors or officers
of their corporations or of other corporations and entities at the request
of their corporations.
Under TBCA art. 2.02-1, there are two standards for indemnification
for directors depending on whether the indemnification arrangement has
been approved by shareholders.13 1 Where the indemnification has not
been approved by shareholders, the scope and right to indemnification
will be limited by law and be dependent on whether the conduct of the
director met certain specified standards. 132 Where the indemnification is
approved by shareholders, the corporation will be permitted to provide
indemnification for acts of the director that may not otherwise be subject
to indemnification under the statute. 133 As a result, under Texas law, a
corporation and its shareholders may in essence establish its own stan-
dards and criteria for defining when and under what terms and circum-
stances indemnification will be made available. Expenses may also be
advanced to a director in respect of a proceeding if the corporation re-
ceives a written affirmation of the director's good faith belief that the
director has met the standards for indemnification and undertakes to re-
imburse the corporation for the expenses if it is ultimately determined
that the director did not meet the standard or is otherwise not entitled to
indemnity. 34 Indemnification of officers and other persons other than
directors in Texas is restricted only by concepts of public policy.
Sections B and C of article 2.02-1 of the TBCA sets forth the general
standard of conduct that will permit a corporation to provide indemnifi-
cation when shareholder approval is not obtained. 35 These provisions
provide that a corporation may indemnify a director for liabilities and
expenses in respect of actions brought against the director by reason of
serving as a director or officer of the corporation (or of another entity at
the request of the corporation) if the conduct of the director was in good
faith and the director reasonably believed that (i) in the case of conduct
in the director's official capacity as a director, the director's conduct was
in the corporation's best interests, and (ii) in all other cases, the director's
130. Id.
131. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
132. Id. art. 2.02-1(K).
133. Id. art. 2.02-1(B).
134. Id. art. 2.02-1(K).
135. Id. art. 2.02-1(B), (C).
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conduct was at least not opposed to the best interest of the corpora-
tion.' 36 Indemnification for criminal actions also requires a director to
have had no reasonable cause to believe the director's conduct was un-
lawful.1 37 In addition, if a director is found liable to the corporation or on
the basis that a personal benefit was improperly received by him, indem-
nification will be limited to expenses actually incurred and will not be
available if the director is found liable for willful or intentional miscon-
duct in the performance of the director's duty to the corporation. 138
Although the scope of indemnification is subject to limitation where
shareholder approval has not been obtained, article 2.02-1(R) provides a
broad exception to this rule. Under TBCA art. 2.02-1(R), a corporation
with the approval of its shareholders may adopt any form of indemnifica-
tion arrangement with its directors covering all forms of liability and stan-
dards of conduct, including conduct and liabilities that the corporation
would otherwise lack power to indemnify under article 2.02-1.139 This
provision was adopted to address the difficulties experienced by many
corporations in obtaining liability insurance for directors and officers and
provides corporations with substantial flexibility in establishing indemni-
fication arrangements to cover liabilities that could be insured against but
would not otherwise be within the scope of indemnity permitted by the
statute. Section R also specifically authorizes alternative forms of indem-
nification arrangements, including self-insurance, the creation of trust
funds to pay indemnification claims, and indemnification contracts. 140 In
the absence of fraud, the judgment of directors as to the terms of an in-
demnification arrangement adopted in accordance with article 2.02-1 will
be conclusive and will not be voidable or subject the directors to liability
on any ground. 141 This exculpatory provision is intended to address the
potential conflict of interest issues that arise when directors approve in-
demnification arrangements that benefit themselves and overrides the
provisions of article 2.35-1 of the TBCA (discussed below).
In contrast to the TBCA, the DGCL provides only one standard for
indemnification, whether or not approved by stockholders. Under sec-
tion 145 of the DGCL, a director or officer may be indemnified if he
acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the interest of the corporation, and, in the case of a criminal
action or proceeding, had no reasonable ground to believe his conduct
was unlawful.' 42 If the action is in the name of the corporation, no in-
demnification may be provided if the person is adjudged liable unless the
court determines that such indemnification is proper.' 43 Expenses may
136. Id. art. 202-1(B)(1), (2).
137. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.02-1(B)(3) (Supp. 1999-2000).
138. Id. art. 2.02-1(E).
139. Id. art. 2.02-1(R).
140. Id. art. 2.02-1(R).
141. Id. art. 2.02-1(R).
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
143. Id. § 145(b).
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also be advanced to a director or officer on an undertaking that the
amounts advanced will be repaid if it is ultimately determined that the
director or officer is not entitled to indemnification. 144 Like the TBCA,
section 145(f) of the DGCL provides that the indemnification permitted
by statute is not exclusive. 145 However, unlike the TBCA, uncertainties
exist as to the ability of a corporation to expand the scope of conduct for
which indemnification may be provided beyond the statute, particularly
where the indemnification relates to a proceeding by or in the name of
the corporation.
3. Interested Director Transactions-Article 2.35-1 of the TBCA and
Section 144 of the DGCL
Both Texas and Delaware have embraced the principle that a transac-
tion or contract between a director and the director's corporation is pre-
sumed to be valid and will not be voidable solely by reason of the
director's interest so long as certain conditions are met.
Section 144 of the DGCL provides that a contract between a director
and the director's corporation will not be voidable due to the director's
interest if (i) the transaction or contract is approved in good faith by a
majority of the disinterested directors after the material facts as to the
relationship or interest and as to. the transaction or contract are disclosed
or known to the directors, (ii) the transaction or contract is approved in
good faith by shareholders after the material facts as to the relationship
or interest and as to the transaction or contract is disclosed or known to
the shareholders, and (iii) the transaction or contract is fair to the corpo-
ration as of the time it is authorized, approved, or ratified by the directors
or shareholders of the corporation. 146 In Flieger v. Lawrence, however,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a transaction or contract may still
be set aside and liability imposed on a director if the transaction is not
fair to the corporation even if approved by the corporation's board or
shareholders as contemplated by the statute. 147
In 1985, Texas followed Delaware's lead in the area of interested direc-
tor transactions and adopted article 2.35-1 of the TBCA.148 In general,
article 2.35-1 provides that a transaction between a corporation and one
or more of its directors or officers will not be voidable solely by reason of
that relationship if the transaction is approved by shareholders or disin-
terested directors after disclosure of the interest, or if the transaction is
otherwise fair.149 Although Article 2.35-1 is essentially identical to § 144
of the DGCL, some uncertainty on the scope of Article 2.35-1 arose be-
cause of Flieger's interpretation of § 144. This imposition of a fairness
144. Id. § 145(e).
145. Id. § 145(f).
146. Id. § 144(a).
147. See Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).




gloss on the Texas statute rendered the effect of the safe harbor provi-
sions in article 2.35-1 uncertain.
In 1997, article 2.35-1 of the TBCA was amended to address the ambi-
guity created by Flieger and to clarify that contracts and transactions be-
tween a corporation and its directors and officers or in which a director or
officer has a financial interest are valid notwithstanding that interest as
long as any one of the following are met: (i) the disinterested directors of
the corporation approve the transaction after disclosure of the interest,
(ii) the shareholders of the corporation approve the transaction after dis-
closure of the interest or (iii) the transaction is fair.150 Under the statute,
if any one of these conditions is met, the contract will be considered valid
notwithstanding the director or officer has an interest in the transac-
tion.151 Article 2.35-1 relies heavily on the statutory definition of "disin-
terested" contained in Article 1.02.152 Under the definition, a director
will be considered "disinterested" if the director is not a party to the con-
tract or transaction or does not otherwise have a material financial inter-
est in the outcome of the contract.153
Article 2.35-1 also changed the general approach of the statute from a
mere presumption that a contract is not voidable by reason of the exis-
tence of an affiliated relationship if certain conditions are met to an abso-
lute safe harbor that provides that an otherwise valid contract will be
valid if the specified conditions are met.154 Although the difference be-
tween the Texas and Delaware constructions is subtle, the distinction is
significant and provides more certainty as transactions are structured.
However, article 2.35-1 does not eliminate a director's or officer's fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation.
4. Director Consideration of Long-Term Interests
It has been implicit under Texas law that a director may consider the
long-term interests of the corporation. However, because short-term
market valuations of a corporation may not always reflect the benefits of
long-term decisions and inherent long-term values, article 13.06 was ad-
ded to the TBCA in 1997 to expressly allow directors to consider the
long-term interests of a corporation and its shareholders when consider-
ing actions that affect the interest of the corporations. 55 Although this
provision was viewed as a mere codification of existing law, it was in-
tended to eliminate any ambiguity that might exist as to the right of a
board of directors to consider long-term interests when evaluating a take-
over proposal. There is no similar provision in the DGCL.
150. Id. art. 2.35-1 (Supp. 2000).
151. Id. art. 2.35-1(A)
152. Id. art. 1.02(A)(12).
153. Id.
154. Compare TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr AtN. art. 2.35-1(A) (Supp. 1996) with TEX. Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.35-1(A) (Supp. 2000).
155. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 13.06 (Supp. 2000).
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5. Director Elections and Removal
Both Texas and Delaware provide that the board of directors of a cor-
poration may consist of one or more persons. Directors are to be elected
annually under both laws. 156 Corporations may, however, provide for a
classification of their boards into two or three classes having two and
three year terms, respectively. 157 Corporations may also provide for spe-
cial classes of directors, with such terms of office and voting rights as may
be provided in their charters.' 58 These latter provisions permit the crea-
tion of what could be called super directors, with generally unlimited
terms and voting rights. In addition, in recognition of the special nature
of investment companies, Texas law permits a registered investment com-
pany to provide for any director terms without regard to annual elec-
tions.1 59 A similar provision is not found in Delaware.
Vacancies, whether by resignation, death, removal, or by reason of an
increase in the size of the board, may be filled by the remaining members
of the board under both Texas and Delaware law. 160 Texas law, however,
limits the number of vacancies that may be filled by action of the board
where the vacancy is created through an increase in the size of the board
to two persons during the period between any two successive annual
meetings. 161
Directors in Delaware may be removed by a vote of the shareholders
entitled to vote in the election of that director, with or without cause,
unless the board of directors is classified. In such a case, unless the certif-
icate of incorporation provides otherwise, directors may only be removed
for cause. 162 Texas takes a different approach and provides that, whether
or not the board of directors is classified, directors may be removed only
for cause unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation or
bylaws of the corporation.163 The removal of a director under Texas law
may also be subject to such further restrictions as may be provided in the
corporation's bylaws. 164
6. Director Actions and Quorums
Actions by the board of directors in both Texas and Delaware may be
taken either at a meeting (in person or by telephone) or by unanimous
156. Id. art. 2.32(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (Supp.
1998).
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d).
158. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.32(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1991).
159. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.32(B) (Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(d) (1991).
160. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.34 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 223 (1991).
161. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.34(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000). Delaware has
no similar restriction.
162. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (Supp. 1998).




written consent. 165 Unless otherwise provided in the charter or bylaws of
the corporation, a quorum for a meeting of a board of directors is defined
to be a majority of the number of directors constituting the whole
board. 166 This quorum requirement may be reduced in both Texas and
Delaware to one-third of the board. 167
7. Committees of the Board
Both Texas and Delaware provide that the board of directors may dele-
gate authority to committees of the board subject to limitations on dele-
gation for fundamental corporate transactions. 168 Among the matters
that a committee of a board of directors will not have the authority to
approve are (i) charter amendments, except to the extent such amend-
ments are the result of the issuance of a series of stock permitted to be
approved by a board of directors, (ii) approving a plan of merger or simi-
lar transaction, (iii) recommending the sale of all or substantially all of
the assets of the corporation outside the ordinary course of its business,
(iv) recommending a voluntary dissolution of the corporation and
(v) amending bylaws or creating new bylaws of the corporation.169 In
addition, under Texas law, a committee of the board of directors may not
fill any vacancy on the board of directors, remove any officer, fix the
compensation of a member of the committee or amend or repeal a reso-
lution approved by the whole board to the extent that such resolution by
its terms is not so amendable or repealable. 170 Further, under both Texas
and Delaware law, no committee of a board of directors has the authority
to authorize a distribution (a dividend in the case of Delaware law) or
authorize the issuance of stock of a corporation unless that authority is
set forth in the charter or bylaws of the corporation. 171 Alternative mem-
bers may also be appointed to committees under both states' laws. 172
8. Liability for Unlawful Distributions
Both Texas and Delaware impose personal liability on directors who
authorize the payment of distributions to shareholders (including share
165. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.10(B) (Vernon 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(f), (i) (1991).
166. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 2.35 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1998).
167. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.35 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1998).
168. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.36 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(c) (1991).
169. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.36 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(c) (1991).
170. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.36(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
171. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.36(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1). See infra note 317 and accompanying text for information regard-
ing the Delaware and Texas provisions governing dividends and distributions to sharehold-
ers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1) (Supp. 1998).
172. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.36(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1).
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purchases) in violation of the statutory requirements. 73
Under Delaware law, liability for an unlawful distribution extends for a
period of six years to all directors other than those who expressly dissent,
with the standard of liability being negligence. 174 Section 172 of the
DGCL, however, provides that a director will be fully protected in relying
in good faith on the records of the corporation and such other informa-
tion, opinions, reports, and statements presented to the corporation by
the corporation's officers, employees and other persons. This applies to
matters that the director reasonably believes are within that person's pro-
fessional or expert competence and have been selected with reasonable
care as to the various components of surplus and other funds from which
distributions may be paid or made.175 Directors are also entitled to re-
ceive contribution from other directors who may be liable for the distri-
bution and are subrogated to the corporation against shareholders who
received the distribution with knowledge that the distribution was unlaw-
ful.176 Under the TBCA, liability for an unlawful distribution extends for
two years instead of six years and applies to all directors who voted for or
assented to the distribution (assent being presumed if a director is present
and does not dissent).' 77 A director will not be liable for an unlawful
distribution if at any time after the distribution, it would have been law-
ful.178 A similar provision does not exist in Delaware. A director will
also not be liable under the TBCA for an unlawful distribution if the
director:
(i) relied in good faith and with ordinary care on information relat-
ing to the calculation of surplus available for the distribution under
TBCA art. 2.38-3;
(ii) relied in good faith and with ordinary care on financial and other
information prepared by officers or employees of the corporation, a
committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member or
legal counsel, investment bankers, accountants and other persons as
to matters the director reasonably believes are within that person's
professional or expert competence;
(iii) in good faith and with ordinary care, considered the assets of
the corporation to have a value equal to at least their book value; or
(iv) when considering whether liabilities have been adequately pro-
vided for, relied in good faith and with ordinary care upon financial
statements of, or other information concerning, any other person
that is contractually obligated to pay, satisfy, or discharge those
liabilities.179
173. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.41(A)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 174(a) (Supp. 1998).
174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
175. Id.
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174(b) (1991).
177. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.41(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
178. Id.
179. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.41(C), (D).
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As in Delaware, a director held liable for an unlawful distribution
under the TBCA will be entitled to contribution from the other directors
who may be similarly liable. The director can also receive contribution
from shareholders who received and accepted the distribution knowing it
was not permitted in proportion to the amounts received by them.180 The
TBCA also expressly provides that the liability of a director for an unlaw-
ful distribution provided for under article 2.41 is the only liability of the
director for the distribution to the corporation or its creditors, thereby
negating any other theory of liability of the director for the distribution
such as a separate fiduciary duty to creditors or a tortious violation of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 181 No similar provision is found in the
DGCL.
9. Reliance on Reports and Opinions
Both Texas and Delaware provide that a director in the discharge of his
duties and powers may rely on information, opinions and reports pre-
pared by officers and employees of the corporation and on other persons
as to matters that the director reasonably believes are within that per-
son's professional or expert competence.' 82 In Delaware, this reliance
must be made in good faith and the selection of outside advisors must
have been made with reasonable care.' 83 In Texas, reliance must be
made both in good faith and with ordinary care.184
10. Inspection of Records
Both Texas and Delaware have codified the common law right of direc-
tors to examine the books and records of a corporation for a purpose
reasonably related to the director's service as a director.
185
B. MERGERS, SHARE EXCHANGES, CONVERSIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND ASSET SALES
1. General
A fundamental distinction between Texas and Delaware corporation
law is the treatment of mergers and business combinations. The principal
distinctions between the two laws are primarily the result of major revi-
sions adopted to the TBCA merger statutes in 1989 and 1997 to provide
Texas corporations with greater flexibility in structuring acquisition or re-
structuring transactions and to provide a framework under which Texas
corporations could engage in commercial transactions in an ever-chang-
180. Id. art. 2.41(E), (F).
181. Id. art. 2.41(G).
182. See id. art. 2.41(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)
(Supp. 1998).
183. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (Supp. 1998); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000).
184. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
185. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.44(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (Supp. 1998).
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ing global economy. 186
Among the transactions that may be effected under the TBCA that
may not be effected under the DGCL are (i) a merger in which there are
multiple surviving corporations and entities, (ii) a division of the assets
and liabilities of a single corporation among multiple corporations and
other entities through a statutory merger, (iii) a share exchange, and (iv)
a conversion of a corporation into a general partnership or other form of
entity without the necessity of completing a merger.187 In addition, al-
though Texas and Delaware both permit corporations to merge and com-
bine with entities other than corporations, the TBCA permits a
substantially wider range of transactions with a broader group of entities
to be effected through statutory mergers than is currently permitted
under the DGCL.
The TBCA also permits sales of assets by a corporation to be made
without shareholder approval under many more circumstances than are
permitted under Delaware law. Finally, the TBCA is clearer as to the
exclusivity of the appraisal remedy for challenges by dissenting share-
holders seeking monetary damages with respect to a merger or similar
transaction. 188
2. Conventional Mergers
Both Texas and Delaware law permit corporations to merge with other
corporations by adopting a plan of merger and obtaining the requisite
shareholder approval. 189 Under Texas law, approval of a merger will gen-
erally require approval of the holders of at least two-thirds of the out-
standing shares entitled to vote on the merger, while Delaware law
provides that mergers may be approved by a vote of the holders of a
majority of the outstanding shares.19 As with other transactions, arti-
cle 2.28 of the TBCA permits a corporation's articles of incorporation to
reduce the required vote to an affirmative vote of the holders of a major-
ity of the outstanding shares. 191
Both Texas and Delaware permit a merger to be effected without
shareholder approval if the corporation is the sole surviving corporation,
the shares of stock of the corporation are not changed as a result of the
merger and the total number of shares of stock issued pursuant to the
merger does not exceed 20% of the shares of the corporation outstanding
186. Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation, supra note 3.
187. Id.
188. For a detailed discussion with respect to the Texas merger provisions and the types
of transactions that may be effected thereunder, see generally Curtis W. Huff, The New
Texas Business Corporation Act Merger Provisions, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 109 (1989).
189. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251-58 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
190. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.03(E) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 1998).
191. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr AiN. art. 2.28.
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immediately prior to the merger.192
Board action on a plan of merger is required under both Texas and
Delaware law. However, Texas law does not require that the board of
directors approve the plan of merger, but rather it need only adopt a
resolution directing the submission of the plan of merger to the corpora-
tion's shareholders. 193 Such a resolution must either recommend that the
plan of merger be approved or communicate the basis for the board's
determination that the plan be submitted to shareholders without any
recommendation. 194 The TBCA's allowance of directors to submit a plan
of merger to shareholders without recommendation is intended to ad-
dress those few circumstances in which a board may consider it appropri-
ate for shareholders to be given the right to vote on a plan of merger but
for fiduciary or other reasons the board has concluded that it would not
be appropriate for the board to make a recommendation. 95 Delaware
law has no similar provision and requires that the board approve the
agreement of merger and declare its advisability, and then submit the
merger agreement to the stockholders for the purpose of their acting on
the agreement. 196 Delaware, however, does permit a merger agreement
to contain a provision requiring that the agreement be submitted to the
stockholders whether or not the board of directors determines at any
time subsequent to declaring its advisability that the agreement is no
longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.197
Under TBCA article 5.06A(2), when a merger takes effect, all rights,
title, and interests to all property owned by each entity that is a party to
the merger are allocated to and vested in one or more of the surviving or
new entities as provided in the plan of merger without reversion or im-
pairment, without further act or deed, and without any transfer or assign-
ment having occurred, but subject to any existing liens or other
encumbrances thereon.198 Without an express statutory statement like
TBCA article 5.06A(2) that the vesting of assets in a surviving entity is
accomplished without a transfer or assignment having occurred, it is pos-
sible that a merger would be deemed to constitute a transfer in the con-
text of a contract or license that required prior approval for a transfer or
assignment. A limited number of cases in other jurisdictions have held
that a merger constituted a transfer for such purposes.199 The DGCL
does not contain a provision comparable to the TBCA article 5.06A(2)
192. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.03(G) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. § 251(f) (1991).
193. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.03(B)(1).
194. Id.
195. Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation, supra note 3, at 36-37.
196. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
197. Id.
198. TXO Prod. Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 137, 142 n.7 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
199. See Egan & French, 1987 Amendments supra note 3; see also, Steven E. Ballew,
Assignment of Rights, Franchises and Obligations of the Disappearing Corporation in a
Merger, 38 Bus. LAW. 45 (1982) (discussing cases dealing with transfer of assets in a merger
context).
[Vol. 54
CHOICE OF STATE OF INCORPORATION
statement that a merger does not involve a transfer.2°°
3. Mergers with Other Entities
Both Texas and Delaware permit the merger of corporations with other
entities, including foreign corporations, non-profit corporations and lim-
ited partnerships. Texas, however, allows a wider range of entities to
merge with Texas corporations than those that are permitted to merge
with Delaware corporations under Delaware law.
The principal provisions of the TBCA authorizing mergers of corpora-
tions with other entities are found in articles 5.01, 5.03, and 5.06, which
are the operative provisions that permit mergers with "other entities,"
and article 1.02A(14), which defines what is an "other entity."'201 An
"other entity" is defined in the TBCA as any entity, whether organized
for profit or not, that is a corporation, limited or general partnership,
joint venture, joint stock company, cooperative, association, bank, insur-
ance company or other legal entity organized pursuant to the laws of any
state or country. 20 2 Thus, the only restrictions in Texas on the types of
entities that a Texas corporation may merge with are those relating to the
other entity.
The operative provisions of the DGCL with respect to mergers of cor-
porations with other entities are found in DGCL §§ 251-264.203 Mergers
with foreign corporations are governed under § 252, while mergers with
or between non-stock and non-profit corporations are governed under
DGCL §§ 255, 256, 257, and 258.204 Mergers with limited partnerships
are governed under DGCL § 263. Although likely the least used, the
most unique provision of the DGCL relating to mergers with other enti-
ties is found in § 254.205 Under this section, a Delaware corporation may
merge with one or more joint-stock associations unless the laws under
which the joint-stock association is formed forbid that type of merger. 206
A "joint-stock association" is defined in § 254(a) as "any association of
the kind commonly known as a joint-stock association or a joint-stock
company and any unincorporated association, trust, or enterprise having
members or having outstanding shares of stock or other evidences of fi-
nancial or beneficial interest therein, whether formed by agreement or
under statutory authority or otherwise, but not including a corporation,
partnership, or limited liability company. '20 7
200. Cf. Star Cellular Tel. Co., Inc. v. Baton Rouge CGSA, Inc., No. 12507, 1993 WL
294847 (Del. Ch. 1993), affd, 647 A.2d 382 (Del. 1994).
201. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 5.01, 5.03, 5.06, 1.02, § A(2) (Vernon Supp.
1999-2000).
202. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 1.02(A)(20) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
203. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251-64.
204. Id. §§ 255-58.
205. Id. § 254.
206. Id. § 254.
207. Id. § 254(a).
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Although the definition of a joint-stock association is quite broad and
would seem to pick up almost all forms of non-corporate entities, there
exists substantial ambiguity in the statute as to exactly what is a joint
stock association given the exclusion of partnerships, corporations and
limited liability companies from the definition. For example, is a joint
venture (which is nothing more than a partnership under another name) a
joint-stock association under Delaware law? Similarly, would a joint ven-
ture be considered a joint-stock association if the agreement creating the
joint venture provided that all the investors would receive shares and that
the joint venture is not a partnership? While the answers to these ques-
tions are unclear under the DGCL, there is no question that under the
TBCA a corporation could merge with either of these types of entities.
Thus, greater certainty is provided under the TBCA for these types of
mergers than is available under the DGCL.
4. Mergers with Multiple Survivors
Under the TBCA, a corporation may enter into a merger agreement
where there are multiple surviving or new corporations or other entities
created in the merger.208
In addition, the TBCA permits a single corporation to adopt a plan of
merger in which it is divided into multiple corporations or entities and its
assets and liabilities are allocated among the surviving or new corpora-
tions or other entities as provided in the plan of merger solely by opera-
tion of law and without any transfer or assignment being made.20 9
Delaware does not provide for the possibility of multiple surviving en-
tities in a merger or a division of a corporation through a statutory
merger. In Delaware, as well as in most other jurisdictions, when parties
to a plan of merger desire to place certain assets and liabilities of one of
the constituent corporations in another entity and distribute the owner-
ship interest of that entity to the shareholders of one or more of the par-
ties to the merger, the transaction must be effected through multiple steps
utilizing common law conveyancing of assets, assumptions of liabilities,
and distributions to shareholders. 210 Similarly, in Delaware, if a single
corporation desires to divide its businesses and operations into two or
more separate corporations or entities and distribute the ownership inter-
ests of those corporations or entities to its shareholders, the transaction
must be effected through a traditional "spin off" of the new corporation
or entity after transferring the desired assets to, and having the unwanted
liabilities assumed by, the corporation or entity to be spun off.2
1
'
To effect a transaction with two or more surviving corporations or
other entities or a division of a single corporation into multiple entities
208. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 5.01, 1.02(A)(18) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
209. See id. arts. 1.02(A)(18), 5.03.
210. Curtis W. Huff, The New Texas Business Corporation Act Merger Provisions, 21
ST. MARY'S L.J. 109, 114-15 (1989).
211. Id.
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through a merger under the TBCA, the plan of merger, in addition to
other statutory requirements, need only specify the manner and basis for
vesting and allocating the assets and liabilities among the surviving or
new entities and provide for the creation of any new entities to be created
under the merger. 212 The manner and basis for converting the shares and
other evidences of ownership of the parties to the merger must also be set
forth in the plan of merger as in any typical merger.213 The TBCA also
makes clear that, as a matter of substantive law in Texas, once a merger
with multiple surviving entities has taken place, only those entities to
which liabilities and obligations have been allocated will be responsible
for the liabilities and obligations allocated to them.214
5. Share Exchanges
The TBCA permits a transaction known as a "share exchange. '215 A
"share exchange" is a transaction in which share interests of a corpora-
tion are acquired by another corporation or entity without the necessity
of a merger of the two entities.216 A share exchange possesses advan-
tages over a traditional merger transaction in that it permits the acquisi-
tion of all of the share interests of one or more classes or series of stock
of a corporation without the acquiring entity going out of existence and
with the acquired entity becoming a subsidiary of the acquiring entity.217
A share exchange is often desirable where the acquiring entity is a hold-
ing company operating through its subsidiaries or where the acquiring
entity desires to acquire only one class or series of stock of the acquired
corporation.218 Absent the availability of a share exchange, this type of
transaction would have to be accomplished through an agreement with
each shareholder or through a "reverse triangular merger" in which a
new subsidiary of the acquiring corporation merges with the acquired
corporation and the holders of the shares of the acquired corporation
receive cash, securities, or other property.219 The procedures for approv-
ing a share exchange under the TBCA are substantially the same as those
for the approval of a merger.220
The DGCL does not permit share exchanges.
6. Conversions
Texas created a new form of transaction known as a "conversion" in
1997. In its simplest terms, a "conversion" is a transaction that allows an
entity to convert its organizational form from one type of entity to an-
212. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.01(B)(2)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
213. Id. art. 5.01(B)(3).
214. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-' ANN. art. 5.06(A)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
215. See id. art. 5.02.
216. Huff, New Texas Business Corporation Act, supra note 210, at 134.
217. Id. at 135.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Act ANN. arts. 5.02, 5.03 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
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other type of entity while allowing it to continue its business enterprise
without interruption and without the need to effect a merger or transfer
of assets. 221
The conversion provisions of the TBCA are set forth in articles 5.17
through 5.20 of the TBCA. Under the conversion provisions, a Texas cor-
poration may convert into another corporation or entity if:
(1) the conversion is approved by the shareholders of the Texas cor-
poration in same manner that a merger would be approved where
the corporation is not the surviving entity;
(2) the conversion is permitted by, or not inconsistent with, the laws
of the state or country in which the entity into which the corporation
is to be converted (the "converted entity") is to be incorporated,
formed, or organized and the incorporation, formation, or organiza-
tion of the converted entity is effected in compliance with such laws;
(3) at the time the conversion becomes effective, each shareholder
of the converting corporation (other than dissenting shareholders
who perfect their rights of dissent under the TBCA) will, unless oth-
erwise agreed to by that shareholder, own an equity interest or other
ownership or security interest in, and be a shareholder, partner,
member, owner or other security holder of, the converted entity;
(4) no shareholder of the converting corporation will, as a result of
the conversion, become personally liable, without the shareholder's
consent, for the liabilities or obligations of the converted entity; and
(5) the converted entity is incorporated, formed, or organized as
part of or pursuant to the plan of conversion (i.e., the converted en-
tity may not be a preexisting operating business entity).222
A foreign corporation or other entity (including a Texas partnership or
limited liability company) may similarly convert into a Texas corporation
(or in the case of a Texas partnership or limited liability company, into
another entity) under the parallel provisions of the statute governing
those entities if:
(1) the conversion is permitted by the laws of the state or country in
which the foreign corporation is incorporated, if a foreign corpora-
tion is converting;
(2) the conversion is either permitted by the laws under which the
other entity is formed or organized or by the constituent documents
of the other entity that are not inconsistent with the laws of the state
or country in which the other entity is formed or organized, if an
other entity is converting; and
(3) the converting entity takes all action that may be required by the
laws of the state or country under which it is incorporated, formed,
or organized and by its constituent documents to effect the
conversion. 223
221. J. Scott Sheehan & David Harrell, Business Law, 60 TEX. B.J. 744, 747 (1997); see
also TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 5.17-5.20 (West 2001).
222. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.17(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
223. Id. art. 5.17(B).
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The procedures for a conversion, including the vote requirement, rights
to dissent and filings, are essentially the same as those for a merger.
Because a conversion represents a mere continuation of an organiza-
tion in a different organizational form, a conversion may only be effected
where the new entity has no other business and may not be used in lieu of
a merger between two pre-existing operating entities. 224 To the extent
another jurisdiction does not expressly provide for a conversion, a Texas
corporation may still convert into such an entity by organizing that entity
in connection with the conversion. 225 In this circumstance, the entity
could be a pre-existing entity as long as it was organized solely for the
conversion.
In September 1999, Delaware added a conversion statute that allows a
Delaware limited liability company, limited partnership, or business trust
to convert into a Delaware corporation and for a Delaware corporation
to convert to a Delaware limited liability company, limited partnership,
or business trust.226 The Delaware statute, which is modeled after the
Texas statute, is substantially more limited than the Texas statute in that it
does not permit conversions from or into entities outside of Delaware or
conversions into or from partnerships and other non-corporate
entities. 227
The tax consequences of a conversion will be dependent upon the spe-
cific transaction and upon whether under the Internal Revenue Service
"check the box" rules the entity changes its organizational form from an
association to a partnership or vice versa for tax purposes.228
7. Sales of Substantially All Assets
a. Shareholder Approval
Texas and Delaware law differ substantially with respect to the ap-
proval that is necessary to authorize a sale of all or substantially all of the
assets of a corporation. In Texas, shareholder approval is not required
for any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all
of the property and assets of a corporation if made in the usual and regu-
lar course of the business of a corporation. 229 A transaction will be con-
sidered to be made in the usual and regular course of business of a
corporation if the corporation either continues to engage in one or more
businesses following the transaction or applies a portion of the considera-
tion received in the transaction to the conduct of a business following the
224. Byron F. Egan, Choosing the Business Entity and Drafting the Documents, nn.19-
28, in University of Houston Real Estate Documents, Workouts and Closings, Dallas/
Houston, TX, (June 8, 2000), available at http://www.jw.com/articles/articles.cfm; Alan W.
Tompkins & Ted S. O'Neil, Annual Survey of Texas Law - Corporations, 49 SMU L. REV.
821, 835-836 (1996); Tex. S. B. 555 § 32, 75th Leg., R.S. 1997.
225. Id.
226. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 265, 266 (1999).
227. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 5.17-5.20 (1997).
228. See Egan, Choosing the Business Entity, supra note 224.
229. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 5.09-5.10 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1999-2000).
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transaction.230 If either of these two conditions ARE met, it is irrelevant
whether or not the sale involves all or substantially all of a corporation's
assets.231 A corporation could thus consummate an asset disposition
without obtaining the shareholder approval otherwise required by TBCA
article 5.10 because the transaction is by definition within the "usual and
regular course of business" and therefore covered by TBCA article
5.09.232 In effect no disposition of assets by a corporation will require
shareholder approval unless the corporation liquidates and ceases to do
business after the disposition.2 33
Where shareholder approval is required under the TBCA for a sale of
all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation, the required approval
will be the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the
outstanding shares.2 34 This percentage may be decreased to the holders
of a majority of the outstanding shares if so provided in the articles of
incorporation of the corporation.2 35
In Delaware, stockholder approval is required for any sale, lease or
exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation's property and as-
sets.236 The DGCL, however, does not define what constitutes all or sub-
stantially all of the property and assets of a corporation and this concept
has been left open for the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis. In
general, where the value or income of the assets to be sold represents
more than 50% of the assets of the corporation on an ongoing or histori-
cal basis, the question of whether the assets or income constitute substan-
tially all of the assets of the corporation is uncertain and will turn on very
fact specific issues that can only be definitively resolved by litigation.237
To avoid this uncertainty, corporations are often forced to seek stock-
holder approval and delay their transactions when the numbers are close
and counsel is unable to provide a satisfactory legal opinion. Where
stockholder approval is considered necessary for the sale of assets by a
Delaware corporation, the required vote is a majority of the holders of
the outstanding stock.238
b. Successor Liability
A major reason parties structure a business combination as an asset
purchase is to allow them to contractually allocate which assets the buyer
will purchase, which liabilities the buyer will assume and which assets and
230. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.09(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
231. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-T ANN. arts. 5.17-5.20 (1997).
232. Egan & French, 1987 Amendments, supra note 3, at 11.
233. See id. at 11-12.
234. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-T ANN. art. 5.10(A)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
235. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-T ANN. art. 2.28 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
236. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991).
237. See Gimbel v. The Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 606-608 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd,
316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981).
238. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991).
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liabilities will be retained by the seller.239 There have developed a num-
ber of exceptions to the buyer's ability to avoid assuming seller liabilities,
some of which are statutory (such as bulk sales and fraudulent transfer
laws) and some have developed through court decisions. 240 Both Dela-
ware and Texas have repealed their bulk sales statutes and have adopted
versions of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.241
In 1979, Art. 5.10B was added to the TBCA to repeal the de facto
merger doctrine in any sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or
substantially all of the assets of a corporation.2 42 While by its terms Art.
5.10B is applicable only to Texas corporations, the TBCA provision is a
powerful statement of Texas public policy. 243 Since the 1979 amendment,
Texas courts have consistently held that a successor corporation that
purchases all or substantially all of a predecessor corporation's assets is
not liable for the predecessor's obligations except where such liability is
expressly assumed.244 In addition, Courts have limited successor liability
under the theories of "mere continuation" or "product line.''245
Since 1933, Courts in Delaware have recognized the de facto merger
doctrine.246 The doctrine has been invoked in cases of sales of assets for
239. See Byron F. Egan, Asset Acquisition Agreement Issues for Corporate Counsel, in
University of Texas 22nd Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Dallas/Houston, TX (March
23, April 14, 2000), available at http://www.texasbusinesslaw.org/members/reports.html;
Byron F. Egan et al., Negotiating Business Acquisitions-Asset Deals (MAPA), in ABA
National Institute on Negotiating Business Acquisitions, Boca Raton, FL (Nov. 7, 2000),
available at http://www.jw.com/articles/articles.cfm.
240. Id.
241. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 24.001 (West 2001); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 §§ 1301-
1311 (2001).
242. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.10 cmt. (West 2001). The 1979 amendment was in
response to the adoption of the de facto merger doctrine by the court in Western Resources
Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). TBCA art. 5.10(B) now provides:
B. A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a
corporation requiring the special authorization of the shareholders of the
corporation under Section A of this article:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant to this Act
or otherwise; and
(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute, does not
make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable for any liability or
obligation of the selling corporation that the acquiring corporation did not
expressly assume.
243. The Texas cases have not tended to focus on article 5.10(B) being literally applica-
ble only if the corporation is incorporated under the TBCA. In the absence of article
5.10(B) applicability, the legal effect of a sale of assets transaction generally would be
determined by the law chosen by the parties. TEX. Bus. AND COMM. CODE § 35.51 (West
2001); see also Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984); DeSantis
v. Wackenhut, 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). Otherwise, the law of the state with the
"most significant relationship" to the transaction. Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F.
Supp. 535, 540 (D. Del. 1988) (citing In re Asbestos Litig., 517 A.2d 697, 699 (Del. 1986));
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
244. Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ);
Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ); Mims v. HRC Autostaff, 2000 WL 251732, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
245. Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 758.
246. Drug v. Hunt. 168 A. 87, 95 (Del. 1933).
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the protection of creditors or stockholders who have suffered an injury by
reason of failure to comply with the statute governing such sales.247 The
general rule in Delaware is that, when one company sells or transfers all
of its assets to another, the purchaser does not become liable for the
debts and liabilities, including torts, of the transferor.24s However, a pur-
chaser may be liable for the obligations of the selling corporation in any
one of the following four situations:
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly assumes such obligations;
(2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller
into the purchaser;
(3) the purchaser is merely a continuation of the seller; or
(4) the transaction has been entered fraudulently.249
8. Different Treatment of Shareholders in Mergers and Share
Exchanges
Articles 5.01 and 5.02 of the TBCA were amended in 1997 to address
an ambiguity that has existed for years under both Texas and Delaware
law as to whether it is permissible to treat holders of shares of a same
class or series of stock differently in the plan of merger or exchange. His-
torically, other than in the context of a merger in which the acquiring
corporation's shares are to be treated differently than all other sharehold-
ers' shares, practitioners have been concerned whether the language in
Articles 5.01 and 5.02 and their merger counterparts in Delaware permit
a plan of merger or exchange to provide that the holders of shares of the
same class or series will be treated differently in the merger or share ex-
change. Although the language of Articles 5.01 and 5.02 was sufficiently
broad to permit different treatment of shareholders in a merger, there
was a concern as to whether the authority actually existed because the
language of the statute did not specifically address the issue. The absence
of this express authorization resulted in disagreements among practition-
ers and the creation of complex transactional structures aimed at avoid-
ing the issue. Articles 5.01 and 5.02 were amended in 1997 to clarify the
issue by expressly recognizing the possibility of different treatment of
shareholders in a plan of merger or exchange. 250
Articles 5.01 and 5.02 require that where shareholders are to be treated
differently in a plan of merger or exchange, the plan of merger or ex-
change must set forth the manner and basis for the conversion of shares
of each class or group of shareholders who are to be treated differently.
In order to protect shareholders who may be treated differently in a plan
247. Id.; Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 757-58 (Del. Ch. 1959).
248. Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535,540 (D. Del. 1988) (citing Polius v.
Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1986)); Fehl v. S.W.C. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 939,
945 (D. Del. 1977).
249. Elmer, 698 F. Supp. at 540 (citing Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1974)); Fehl, 433 F. Supp. at 945).
250. See TEX. Bus. CoRn. Acr ANN. arts. 5.01(B)(3), 5.02(B)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999-
2000).
[Vol. 54
CHOICE OF STATE OF INCORPORATION
of merger or exchange, Article 5.11 of the TBCA adds a requirement to
the provisions eliminating dissenters' rights for transactions involving the
issuance of shares of a public corporation.2 51 This additional requirement
is that a shareholder not be required by the terms of the plan of merger
or exchange to accept any consideration that is different than the consid-
eration to be provided to the holder of any other shares of the same class
or series of shares held by that shareholder. This new requirement does
not require dissenters' rights where the acquiring entity's shares in the
target company are canceled without consideration and all other share-
holders are otherwise treated the same. Claims for breaches of fiduciary
duty and injunctive relief for mergers and exchanges where shareholders
are improperly treated differently may still be brought prior to the
merger. After a merger or exchange, however, the right to dissent will
continue to be the sole remedy.
9. Dissenters' Rights and Exclusivity of Remedy
Both Texas and Delaware law provide shareholders of corporations
with dissenters' rights in merger transactions. 252 Texas also provides dis-
senters' rights for share exchanges and asset sales that require share-
holder approval under the TBCA.2 53 Delaware does not provide
dissenters' rights for asset sales. Dissenters' rights under the TBCA and
DGCL permit a shareholder to seek an appraisal of and payment for the
fair value of his shares in lieu of receiving the consideration that would be
received by him in the merger or other transaction. The procedures for
perfecting dissenters' rights are substantially the same under Texas and
Delaware law.254 The fair value of shares under both the TBCA and the
DGCL is the value of the shares of the corporation as a going concern,
without any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the transac-
tion.255 Interest on the fair value of the shares must also be paid on the
amount due the shareholder.2 56
An exception to the right of a shareholder to dissent and seek an ap-
praisal and payment for his shares is provided under both the TBCA and
the DGCL where the shareholder's shares are part of a class or series of
publicly traded equity securities and the shareholder will only receive
publicly traded equity securities and cash in lieu of fractional shares as a
result of the transaction.257 The rationale for denying dissenters' rights
under these circumstances is that an efficient market exists for the shares
251. Id. art. 5.11.
252. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 5.11; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
253. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.11(A)(2).
254. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 5.12-5.13 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1998).
255. TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 5.12(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1998).
256. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.12(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1998).
257. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.11(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1998).
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both before and after the merger in which the shareholder will have the
right to "vote with his feet" by selling his shares in the market. The ex-
ception also reflects a legislative policy that the market price of shares of
a public company will be the best indication of the fair value of a dissent-
ing shareholder's shares.
A publicly traded equity security for purposes of the TBCA is a stock
that is listed on a national securities exchange "or held of record by not
less than 2,000 shareholders. '2 5 8 In addition to these types of securities,
the DGCL and the TBCA include equity securities designated as a na-
tional market security on an interdealer quotations system by the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Inc.2 59
Both Texas and Delaware law also provide that shareholders not enti-
tled to vote on a merger or other transaction for which dissenters' rights
are available will not have dissenters' rights.2 60
Although dissenters' rights under the TBCA and the DGCL are similar
in substance and procedure, the TBCA is much clearer in its treatment of
the relationship between the appraisal remedy and other remedies that a
dissenting shareholder may have with respect to a transaction. Arti-
cle 5.12 section G of the TBCA provides that, absent fraud in the transac-
tion, the dissent and appraisal remedy under the TBCA is the sole
remedy available to the shareholder for monetary relief for a merger,
share exchange or asset sale. Article 5.12 section G further provides that
if the corporation complies with its obligations under the statute by offer-
ing the dissenting shareholder the right to dissent and receive a cash pay-
ment equal to the fair value of his shares through the appraisal process
under the statute, the shareholder will not be entitled to bring suit for the
recovery of the value of his shares or for any other money damages. This
rule applies even if the shareholder's claim is based on an allegation of
unfairness or fraud in that the statute contemplates that if the remedy
sought by a shareholder is money damages, a statutory appraisal subject
to court review is the most efficient and proper means for compensating
the shareholder for his alleged damage. Article 5.12 section G, however,
does not prohibit a shareholder from seeking equitable relief based on
fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, a shareholder is free to seek
injunctive or other equitable relief with respect to a proposed transaction.
The dissent and appraisal provisions of the DGCL are silent on
whether appraisal is the sole remedy of a stockholder seeking monetary
damages for the fair value of a stockholder's shares. although the Dela-
ware courts have generally provided that appraisal is the exclusive rem-
edy for a dissenting stockholder seeking monetary damages, the courts
have on occasion held that appraisal may not be the exclusive remedy in
258. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.11(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
259. TEX. Bus. CORP. Act ANN. art. 5.11 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)(i) (Supp. 1998).
260. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.11 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (Supp. 1998).
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cases involving fraud or breach of duty of fair dealing.261
10. Short Form Mergers With Other Entities
Article 5.16 of the TBCA relating to short form mergers permits a
Texas corporation to merge with all forms of entities through a short form
merger.262 Prior to the 1989 amendments, only corporations that held
90% or more of the outstanding shares of each class or series of another
corporation could engage in a short form merger. To effect a short form
merger with a non-corporate entity, the parent corporation must own at
least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class or series of shares,
membership interests, or other ownership interests of the other entity.
Additionally, the laws of the jurisdiction of the other entity must either
permit the merger or the organizational documents of that entity must
not be inconsistent with those laws. A similar provision exists where a
Texas corporation is merged into its non-corporate entity parent.
11. Holding Company Mergers; Shareholder Vote Exception
Neither the TBCA nor the DGCL require shareholder approval where
a corporation engages in a merger for the sole purpose of creating a hold-
ing company.
12. Interested Stockholder Transactions
Both Delaware and Texas provide protections to shareholders of public
companies against interested shareholder transactions that occur after a
shareholder has acquired a 15% to 20% ownership interest. The Dela-
ware limitations are found in § 203 of the DGCL and the Texas limita-
tions are found in Part Thirteen of the TBCA.263
13. Section 203 of the DGCL
Section 203 of the DGCL imposes restrictions on transactions between
public corporations and certain stockholders defined as "interested stock-
holders" unless specific conditions have been met. In general, § 203 pro-
vides that a publicly held Delaware corporation may not engage in a
business combination with any interested stockholder for a period of
three years following the date the stockholder first became an interested
stockholder unless (i) prior to that date the board of directors of the cor-
poration approved the business combination or the transaction that re-
sulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder, 264 (ii) the
261. See, e.g., Weinburger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-704 (Del. 1983); Sealy Mat-
tress Co., Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1341 (Del. Ch. 1987).
262. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.16 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
263. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 13; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203.
264. A vote to so waive the protection of DGCL § 203 is sometimes referred to as a
"§ 203 waiver" and requires that the directors act consistently with their fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty. In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 18336, 2000 WL 1847679,
at *7 (Del Ch. Dec. 13, 2000).
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interested stockholder became an interested stockholder as a result of
acquiring at least 85% of the voting stock of the corporation, 265 excluding
shares held by directors and officers and employee benefit plans in which
participants do not have the right to determine confidentially whether
their shares will be tendered in a tender or exchange offer, or (iii) the
transaction is approved by stockholders by an affirmative vote of at least
two-thirds of the outstanding shares excluding the shares held by the in-
terested stockholder.
An interested stockholder is generally defined under DGCL
§ 203(c)(3) as any person that directly or indirectly owns or controls or
has beneficial ownership or control of at least 15% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation.2 66 A business combination is defined under
DGCL § 203 to include (i) mergers, (ii) consolidations, (iii) direct or indi-
rect sales, leases, exchanges, mortgages, transfers and other dispositions
of assets to the interested stockholder having an aggregate market value
greater than 10% of the total aggregate market value of the assets of the
corporation, (iv) various issuances of stock and securities to the inter-
ested stockholder that are not issued to other stockholders on a similar
basis and (v) various other transactions in which the interested stock-
holder receives a benefit, directly or indirectly, from the corporation that
is not proportionally received by other stockholders.267
The provisions of DGCL § 203 apply only to public corporations (i.e.,
corporations the stock of which is listed on a national securities exchange,
authorized for quotation on interdealer quotation system of a registered
national securities association or held of record by more than 2,000 stock-
holders).2 68 The provisions of DGCL § 203 also will not apply to certain
stockholders who held their shares prior to the adoption of DGCL § 203
or to stockholders whose acquisition of shares is approved by the corpo-
ration prior to the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder. In
addition, DGCL § 203 will not apply if the certificate of incorporation of
the corporation or the bylaws approved by stockholders provides that the
statute will not apply; provided that any amendment eliminating the ap-
plication of DGCL § 203 will not become effective for twelve months af-
ter approval and the statute will continue to apply to any person who was
an interested stockholder prior to the adoption of the amendment.
14. Part Thirteen of the TBCA
Part Thirteen of the TBCA, like § 203 of the DGCL, imposes a special
voting requirement for the approval of certain business combinations and
related party transactions between public corporations and affiliated
265. In the context of a corporation with more than one class of voting stock where one
class has more votes per share than another class, there is an "interesting interpretative
challenge" whether "85% of the voting stock" refers to the number of shares or the num-
ber of votes. In re Digex, 2000 WL 1847679 at *18.
266. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3) (1991).
267. Id. § 203(b).
268. Id.
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shareholders unless the transaction or the acquisition of shares by the
affiliated shareholder is approved by the board of directors prior to the
affiliated shareholder becoming an affiliated shareholder. 269
In general, Part Thirteen prohibits certain mergers, sales of assets, re-
classifications and other transactions (defined as business combinations)
between shareholders beneficially owning 20% or more of the outstand-
ing stock of a Texas public corporation (such shareholders being defined
as affiliated shareholders) for a period of three years from the time the
shareholder acquires shares representing 20% or more of the corpora-
tion's voting power, unless two-thirds of the unaffiliated shareholders ap-
prove the transaction at a meeting held no earlier than six months after
the shareholder acquires that ownership. The provisions requiring the
special vote of shareholders will not apply to any transaction with an affil-
iated shareholder if the transaction or the purchase of shares by the affili-
ated shareholder is approved by the board of directors before the
affiliated shareholder acquires beneficial ownership of 20% of the shares,
or if the affiliated shareholder was an affiliated shareholder prior to De-
cember 31, 1996, and continued as such through the date of the transac-
tion. Part Thirteen does not contain the Delaware 85% of the
unaffiliated shares tender offer exception, which was considered by the
drafters to be a major loophole in the Delaware statute, and attempts to
clarify various uncertainties and ambiguities contained in the Delaware
statute.
Part Thirteen applies only to an "issuing public corporation", which is
defined to be a corporation organized under the laws of Texas that has:
(i) 100 or more shareholders, (ii) any class or series of its voting shares
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or
similar or successor statute, or (iii) any class or series of its voting shares
qualified for trading in a national market system.270 For the purposes of
this definition, "a shareholder is a shareholder of record as shown by the
share transfer records of the corporation." 271 Part Thirteen also contains
an opt-out provision that allows a corporation to elect out of the statute
by adopting a by-law or charter amendment prior to December 31,
1997.272
C. STOCKHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND ACTIONS; LIABILITIES AND
PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS
1. General Voting Requirements
Both Texas (TBCA art. 2.28) and Delaware (DGCL § 216) provide
that the general requirement for a quorum of shareholders at a meeting
of shareholders will be the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares
269. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 13.01-13.08 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
270. Id. art. 13.02(A)(6).
271. Id.
272. Id. art 13.04(A)(1).
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entitled to vote at the meeting.2 73 This requirement may be increased or
decreased to as few as one-third of the holders of the outstanding shares
if so provided in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws in the case of a
Delaware corporation and in the articles of incorporation in the case of a
Texas corporation. 274 In Texas and Delaware, once there is a quorum of
shareholders at a meeting of shareholders, there is a quorum for all mat-
ters to be acted on that meeting.
Under both Texas and Delaware law, the vote required for approval of
certain matters varies depending on the matter requiring action. The
vote required for the election of directors, in Texas and in Delaware, is a
plurality of votes cast unless otherwise provided in the charter or bylaws
of the corporation.275 The vote required for approval of fundamental
corporate transactions, such as charter amendments, mergers, and disso-
lutions, is the holders of a majority of the outstanding voting power enti-
tled to vote on the matter in Delaware and the holders of at least two-
thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote on the matter.276 A cor-
poration may increase this voting requirement under both Texas and Del-
aware law.2 77 This requirement may also be reduced in Texas in the
articles of incorporation of the corporation to not less than the holders of
a majority of the voting power entitled to vote on the matter.278
As for all other actions that may be taken by shareholders, unless oth-
erwise provided in the corporation's certificate of incorporation or by-
laws, Delaware provides that approval requires a majority of the shares
represented at the meeting, in person or by proxy, entitled to vote on the
matter.279 In Texas, unless otherwise provided in the corporation's arti-
cles of incorporation or bylaws, the general vote requirement for share-
holder action on matters other than the election of directors and
extraordinary transactions is a majority of the votes cast "for", "against"
or expressly abstaining on the matter.280 This provision adds clarity to
the Securities and Exchange Commission's rules for determining the ef-
fect of "broker non-votes. '281 As a result, under Texas law, "broker non-
votes" will be considered for purposes of a quorum, but will not be con-
sidered a vote for or against the matter.
In Texas, unless expressly prohibited by the articles of incorporation,
shareholders will have the right to cumulate their votes in the election of
273. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.28 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 216 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
274. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.28 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 216 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
275. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 2.28(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1991 & 1998 Supp.).
276. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 4.02(A)(3), 5.03(E), 6.03(A)(3) (Vernon Supp.
1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(b)(1), 252(c), 275(b) (Supp. 1998).
277. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.28 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 216 (Supp. 1998).
278. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.28(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
279. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (Supp. 1998).
280. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.28(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
281. See id.
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directors if they notify the corporation at least one day before the meet-
ing of their intent to do so.2 82 In Delaware, stockholders will not have
any cumulative voting rights unless provided in the certificate of
incorporation. 283
2. Voting Rights
Under both Texas and Delaware law, each outstanding share is entitled
to one vote unless otherwise provided in the corporation's charter.284
Shares of the same class are required to be identical unless divided into
one or more series.2 85 Both Texas and Delaware, however, permit limita-
tions on the voting rights of holders of the same class or series of shares,
depending on the characteristics of the shares.286
3. Proxies
Both Texas and Delaware permit the voting of shares by proxy. Under
Texas law, no proxy will be valid eleven months after execution unless
otherwise provided in the proxy. Proxies in Delaware will not be valid
after three years unless otherwise provided in the proxy.287 Proxies
under both Texas and Delaware law may be made irrevocable only if cou-
pled with an interest.288 Article 2.29 of the TBCA sets forth a non-ex-
haustive list of relationships that constitute a sufficient interest to support
an irrevocable proxy.289 These interests include (i) a pledgee, (ii) an op-
tion or purchase agreement, (iii) a creditor relationship, (iv) an employee
whose contract with the corporation requires the proxy and (v) any party
to a voting agreement permitted by the TBCA.290 The DGCL does not
provide a similar list of safe harbor relationships and relies on case law to
determine what does and does not constitute a sufficient interest to sup-
port an irrevocable proxy.291
Texas and Delaware both permit proxies to be given through electronic
transmission, such as telegrams, cablegrams and other similar process.292
Under Article 9.10 of the TBCA, such proxies are considered valid with-
out any further conditions. In Delaware, electronic pr6xies must set forth
or be submitted with information from which it can be determined that
282. Id. art. 2.29.
283. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (Supp. 1998).
284. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.29 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1999-2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
285. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.12(A) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1999-2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
286. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.29(A) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1999-2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
287. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
288. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.29(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 212(e) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
289. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r ANN. art. 2.29(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
290. Id.
291. Huff, Choce of State of Incorporation, supra note 3, at 24.
292. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.10(A)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c) (Supp. 1999).
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the transmission was authorized by the stockholder and requires that the
inspectors of election specify the information upon which they relied.293
4. Action by Written Consent
Both Texas and Delaware permit any action that may be effected at an
annual or special meeting of shareholders to be taken by written consents
signed by all of the shareholders entitled to vote on such matter.194
Stockholder action may also be taken in Delaware by the written consent
of less than all stockholders unless prohibited in the corporation's certifi-
cate of incorporation. 295 Shareholders of a Texas corporation may act
through written consents executed by less than all shareholders entitled
to vote on the matter only if permitted in the corporation's articles of
incorporation.296 Under both Texas and Delaware law, if shareholder ac-
tion is taken by the written consent of less than all shareholders entitled
to vote on the matter, the required vote will be the minimum vote that
would have been necessary at a meeting at which all holders of shares
entitled to vote on the matter were present and voted.297 Prompt notice
of any action by shareholders by written consent is required to be pro-
vided under both Texas and Delaware law to those shareholders who did
not consent to the matter.298
5. Voting of Shares Held in Trust
Article 2.29 of the TBCA does not permit a corporation to vote shares
of the corporation held by it.299 Historically, there was some question as
to the effect of this provision on shares held by or on behalf of the corpo-
ration in trust or other fiduciary capacity on behalf of employee benefit
plans and in other similar situations. To clarify the issue, Article 2.29B of
the TBCA was amended in 1997 to expressly allow a corporation to vote
shares of its own stock that are held in a trust.
6. Class Voting
Both Texas and Delaware law provide that each outstanding share will
be entitled to one vote on all matters presented to shareholders unless
otherwise provided in the corporation's charter.300 In addition, whether
or not entitled to vote on matters presented to shareholders generally,
special class voting rights are provided to shareholders in Texas and Dela-
293. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c)(2) (Vernon Supp 1999-2000).
294. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.10(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1999).
295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1999).
296. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.10(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
297. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.10(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1998).
298. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.10(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1999).
299. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.29(A) (Vernon 1980).
300. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (Supp. 1999-2000).
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ware for certain types of actions, such as charter amendments, mergers
and share exchanges.
In Texas, unless effected pursuant to an amendment to the articles of
incorporation of the corporation by the board of directors pursuant to
their authority to fix the terms of a new class or series of blank check
stock, a class vote will be provided to holders of shares in connection with
any amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation if the
amendment would (i) increase or decrease the authorized number of
shares of the class or series of shares, (ii) change the par value of the
shares, (iii) effect an exchange, reclassification or cancellation of all or
part of the shares of that class of series, (iv) require an exchange of all or
any part of the shares of that class or series, (v) change the designations,
preferences, limitations or relative rights of the shares of that class or
series, (vi) create a senior class or series of shares, (vi) limit or deny ex-
isting preemptive rights, (vii) cancel or otherwise affect dividends that
have accrued but that have not been declared, or (viii) elect or make a
change from close corporation status.30 1 Shareholders of a Texas corpora-
tion will also have a class vote on (i) a merger if the merger effects a
change in the rights of the holders of the shares that if contained in an
amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation would require a
class vote, (ii) a share exchange involving that class or series of shares and
(iii) dissolutions. 302
In Delaware, the holders of shares of a class or series will have a class
vote on an amendment to the corporation's certificate of incorporation if
the amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate number of au-
thorized shares of that class or series, change the par value of the shares
or alter or change the powers, preferences or special rights of the shares
of that class or series adversely, which term is not defined and must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 303 Stockholders in Delaware will
also be entitled to a class vote on a merger if the merger effects such an
amendment to the corporation's certificate of incorporation.
Although the class voting provisions of Texas and Delaware are similar,
one fundamental difference between Texas and Delaware law with re-
spect to class voting relates to a quirk in the Delaware statute that per-
mits the holders of common stock or other shares entitled to vote on all
matters generally to vote on an amendment to the terms of the shares of
another class of securities even if the amendment would not adversely
affect them unless the charter expressly provides otherwise. This right
extends even to changes in terms of shares that are created pursuant to
the blank check authority reserved in the board of directors to designate
the terms of the shares and where the board would otherwise have the
301. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 4.03(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
302. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 5.03(F)(1), 5.03(F)(2), 6.03(A)(3) (Vernon 1999-
2000).
303. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (1991).
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authority to create a new class of stock with those terms.3° 4 To address
this issue, Article 4.03 section C of the TBCA provides that unless other-
wise required in the corporation's articles of incorporation, the approval
of an amendment to a corporation's articles of incorporation that would
solely effect changes in the designations, preferences, limitations and rel-
ative rights of one or more classes or series of shares of the corporation
that have been established pursuant to board authority to designate blank
check stock will not require any approval of the holders of any other class
or series of stock as long as the amended terms are within the scope of
authority of the board of directors to establish in connection with a new
issuance of blank check stock.30 5
7. Inspectors of Election
Delaware law imposes certain obligations on public companies to ap-
point one or more inspectors of election to act at a meeting of stockhold-
ers and to make a written report thereon. Under DGCL § 231, the
inspectors at a meeting must: (i) ascertain the number of shares outstand-
ing and the voting power thereof, (ii) determine the number of shares
represented at the meeting and the validity of all proxies and ballots,
(iii) count all votes and ballots, (iv) determine and retain records of all
challenges made to any determination made by the inspectors and
(v) certify their determination of the number of shares represented at the
meeting and their count of all votes and ballots. Section 231 of the
DGCL also requires public companies to announce at all meetings of
stockholders the date and time of the opening and closing of the polls for
voting on each matter presented to shareholders for consideration. Texas
has no similar mandatory requirement for the appointment of inspectors
of election or for the procedures to be followed in receiving the vote of
shareholders of a public company.
8. Special Meetings
Under Texas law, holders of at least 10% of all the shares of stock
entitled to vote at a special meeting on a matter may call a special meet-
ing of shareholders to act on that matter unless the articles of incorpora-
tion of the corporation require a larger percentage of the shares, not to
exceed 50% of the shares, to call such a meeting.30 6 Delaware law does
not provide an express right of stockholders to call a special meeting of
stockholders. Stockholders, however, can act by majority written consent
in Delaware, unless otherwise provided in the corporation's certificate of
incorporation. 307
304. Id. §§ 212(a), 242(b)(2).
305. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 4.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
306. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.24(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
307. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1998).
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9. Shareholder Lists and Access to Other Information
Under Texas law, any shareholder who holds at least 5% of all of the
outstanding shares of a corporation or who has held his shares for at least
six months will have the right to examine at any reasonable time, for any
proper purpose, the relevant books and records of account, minutes and
share transfer records of the corporation.308 Delaware does not impose a
minimum share ownership or period of ownership condition on the right
of a stockholder to inspect the stock ledger and other books and records
of a corporation for a proper purpose.30 9 A proper purpose is defined in
Delaware as a purpose reasonably related to the person's interest as a
stockholder. 310 Texas does not define a proper purpose, but it is implicit
under Article 2.44 that a proper purpose must be one that relates to the
shareholder's interest in the corporation. Both Texas and Delaware set
forth strict procedures to be followed when a shareholder exercises this
right.311
10. Shareholder Liability
Both Texas and Delaware recognize the corporate fiction and the im-
portance of the limited liability nature of corporations from a public pol-
icy standpoint. In fact, both Texas and Delaware have historically
provided in their statutes that shareholders of corporations will not be
held liable for the debts of their corporations solely by reason of being a
shareholder. 312 Notwithstanding this general principle, case law in the
States of Texas and Delaware has on occasion imposed liability on share-
holders of corporations under various equitable theories. Generally, the
corporate veil has been vulnerable to attack where the courts have found
the corporation was used by the shareholder for fraudulent purposes,
with the courts using catch phrases such as actual fraud, constructive
fraud and sham to perpetuate a fraud. Shareholders have also been
found liable for the obligations of their corporations where their corpora-
tions have been inadequately capitalized. In addition, although not the
sole basis for imposing liability, the failure to follow certain corporate
formalities has been cited by some courts as a factor to be considered in
holding shareholders liable for corporate obligations.
To provide greater certainty with respect to the liability of shareholders
for the obligations of their corporations in light of existing case law, vari-
ous amendments have been made to Article 2.21 of the TBCA since 1989,
to make clear that a shareholder will not be liable for any contractual
obligations of the shareholder's corporation or its affiliate on the theory
308. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.44(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
309. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1998).
310. Id. § 220(b).
311. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.44 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1998).
312. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (Supp. 1998).
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that the shareholder was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis
of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud or any
other similar theory unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the share-
holder caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating
and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the plaintiff primarily for the direct
personal benefit of the shareholder. 313 In addition, Article 2.21 section
A(3) of the TBCA expressly provides that the failure to comply with cor-
porate formalities cannot be used as a basis to impose liability on a share-
holder for liabilities (contractual, tort or otherwise) of the corporation.314
The provisions of Article 2.21 reflect a legislative recognition of the
fact that when parties contract with a corporation, they have expressly
chosen the party they will look to for any breaches of the contract and
that it would be manifestly unfair to the corporation's shareholders, and
would reap an unintended benefit to the obligee, to impose personal lia-
bility on the shareholder for obligations of his corporation unless the cor-
poration was used for the purpose of intentionally perpetrating an actual
fraud for the direct personal benefit of the shareholder.
Delaware does not contain a similar provision to that set forth in Arti-
cle 2.21 and the circumstance under which the corporate veil may be
pierced is subject to judicial application of broad equitable principles to
specific factual circumstances.
11. Shareholder Preemptive Rights
The TBCA provides that shareholders of a corporation have preemp-
tive rights to acquire newly issued shares of a corporation except to the
extent limited or denied in the corporation's articles of incorporation. 315
Delaware law provides that shareholders will have no preemptive rights
unless set forth in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. 31 6
The existence of preemptive rights in Texas and other jurisdictions has
created various legal uncertainties for corporate practitioners over the
years when shares have been issued by clients in violation of preemptive
rights. Often a violation of the preemptive rights is not discovered many
years, at which point it may be difficult to locate all of the corporation's
prior shareholders and obtain waivers of the prior violation. In addition,
the remedy for a past violation is often unclear.
To address the potential problems of preemptive rights violations,
while maintaining the general rule in Texas that shareholders should have
preemptive rights unless otherwise denied in the articles of incorporation,
Article 2.22-1 of the TBCA imposes limits on the exercise of preemptive
rights. Under Article 2.22-1, unless the articles of incorporation of a cor-
poration otherwise provide, preemptive rights will not extend to (i)
shares offered and sold to employees pursuant to a plan that has been
313. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr AN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
314. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
315. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.22-1 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
316. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (Supp. 1998).
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approved by the holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote on the
plan at a meeting of shareholders or (ii) shares that are sold for consider-
ation other than cash. 317 Thus, while preemptive rights will apply to sales
of stock to third parties for cash, shares issued pursuant to shareholder-
approved employee benefit plans or as part of acquisitions, mergers and
similar transactions will not trigger a shareholder's preemptive rights.
Article 2.22-1 provides that, unless otherwise stated in a corporation's
articles of incorporation, shares that are preferred and limited as to divi-
dends or assets will not be entitled to preemptive rights as to other
shares, and shares that are not preferred or limited as to dividends or
assets will not be entitled to preemptive rights in regard to shares that are
preferred or limited as to dividends or assets. In addition, holders of
shares without voting power have no preemptive rights to acquire shares
with voting power. Article 2.22-1B further provides that the board of
directors is authorized to establish a fair and reasonable opportunity for
the shareholders to exercise their preemptive rights.
Article 2.22-1C of the TBCA establishes a statute of limitations for vio-
lations of preemptive rights. Under Article 2.22-1C, no action with re-
spect to a violation of preemptive rights may be made after the earlier of
(i) one year from the date that the shareholder was advised that his pre-
emptive right was violated or (ii) four years after the date on which the
corporation issued, sold or otherwise distributed the shares subject to the
preemptive right. Article 2.22-1 section D of the TBCA further provides
a general rule that only the original shareholders of record at the time of
the violation will have a right to bring a claim and that a transferee of
shares will not acquire that claim unless the preemptive right is separately
assigned to the transferee.
Delaware does not contain similar provisions dealing with the difficul-
ties of curing past violations of preemptive rights.
D. STOCK ISSUANCES
1. General
Both Texas and Delaware provide corporations with a wide latitude of
options for establishing the rights and preferences of different classes and
series of stock.318 In general, shares of Texas and Delaware corporations
may have differing rights as to voting, redemption, dividends, distribu-
tions on liquidation, rights of exchange for securities or other property
and conversion into other securities. Delaware law, however, restricts the
right of a corporation to establish certain rights (such as preferential divi-
dends and special rights on liquidation) for stock referred to as preferred
or special stock.319Although the Delaware restrictions can generally be
drafted around, they do require the existence of some class or series of
317. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.22-1(B)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
318. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 151 (1991).
319. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(c), (d) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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stock that is essentially common stock and has general rights to vote and
receive dividends and distributions after the rights of the holders of pre-
ferred and special stock have been satisfied. In Texas, the terms of shares
can generally be structured in any manner desired by the corporation
without the need for a general class or series of common stock. In addi-
tion, Delaware does not permit shares to be redeemable unless at least
one class or series of stock with full voting rights has no redemption
rights.320 Texas has no such restriction.
Both Texas and Delaware provide that shares of the same series are to
be identical. However, both Texas and Delaware allow for limitations to
be placed on the rights of certain holders of shares of the same class or
series to have differing voting rights. In Texas, this right is expressly set
forth in TBCA article 2.29 section A(1)(a), while in Delaware it has been
judicially determined by an implicit reference to this right in § 212 of the
DGCL.321
Both Texas and Delaware permit the use of blank check preferred and
common stock, the terms of which may be fixed by the corporation's
board of directors. 322 In this regard, both Texas and Delaware law com-
pare favorably to other jurisdictions where this right is generally limited
to preferred stock and in some states to only certain terms.
2. Valid Consideration for Shares; Partially Paid Shares
Texas and Delaware law differ substantially on the type of considera-
tion that may be received for the issuance of shares. Under the TBCA,
shares may be issued for consideration consisting of any tangible or intan-
gible benefit to the corporation, including cash, promissory notes, ser-
vices performed, contracts for services to be performed and other
securities of the corporation.323 Under the Delaware Constitution and
§ 152 of the DGCL, shares of stock may only be issued for money paid,
labor done or personal property, or real estate or leases thereof actually
acquired. 324 Thus, the type of consideration that may be received by a
Texas corporation is materially broader than that which is permitted
under Delaware law and specifically includes debt obligations and con-
tracts for future services. Delaware law, however, does permit shares to
be considered fully paid and nonassessable if valid consideration is re-
ceived for at least the par value of the shares and a binding obligation
such as a promissory note to pay the remainder is received. 325
Although Delaware limits the type of consideration that may be used
for the valid issuance of stock, it does allow the issuance of partially paid
320. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b)-(d) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
321. See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 122-24 (Del. 1977).
322. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 151(g) (Supp. 1998).
323. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 2.16(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
324. See DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. IX, § 3; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1991).
325. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1991).
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stock, which will be limited as to rights to dividends. 326 Texas corpora-
tions are not permitted to issue partially paid stock, but this restriction is
of little consequence given a corporation's right to receive debt obliga-
tions and executory contracts as valid consideration for the issuance of
shares.
Both Texas and Delaware law provide that in the absence of fraud in
the transaction, the determination by a corporation's board of directors
of the value of the consideration received for shares of the corporation
will be conclusive. 327
3. Stock Options and Convertible Securities
Both Texas and Delaware expressly permit the use of options and other
rights to purchase and acquire securities.32 8 Both states also require as
general matter that options and other rights to acquire stock must be sup-
ported by consideration and that, absent fraud in the transaction by the
board of directors, the judgment of the board of directors as to the ade-
quacy of the consideration will be conclusive. 329 In recognition of the
difficulties that sometimes exist in identifying sufficient consideration for
options and other rights to purchase shares that are issued to sharehold-
ers, employees, officers and directors in connection with rights plans,
rights offerings and stock option arrangements, Texas expressly permits
options and other rights to purchase shares to be granted to shareholders,
employees, officers and directors without consideration if, in the judg-
ment of the board of directors, the issuance of those options or rights
would be in the interest of the corporation.33° Delaware does not have
such a provision.
Texas also provides a means by which the consideration paid for an
option or other right to purchase shares will be considered for purposes
of determining the sufficiency of the consideration for shares purchased
on the exercise of an option or other right.331 Thus, if in connection with
a financing, restructuring or leveraged buyout of a corporation, a person
advances funds or other consideration for a package of securities that
includes warrants or options to purchase shares without further payment
or at an exercise price below the par value of the shares, the considera-
tion received for the warrants or options on issuance will be applied to
determine if adequate consideration under the statute (i.e., an amount
equal to at least the par value of the shares) is received upon the issuance
of the underlying shares. Delaware has no similar provision for applying
326. Id. § 156.
327. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.16(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1991).
328. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.14-1 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1991).
329. TEX. Bus. CoR-P. Acr ANN. art. 2.16(B) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152
(Supp. 1998).
330. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.14-1 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
331. Id. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.15(F).
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the consideration received for an option or right to acquire shares against
the minimum par value consideration requirement for the shares pur-
chased on exercise. 332
4. Transfer Restrictions
Both Texas and Delaware law permit restrictions on transfers of shares
to be imposed to enforce buy/sell arrangements, to maintain a corpora-
tion's tax status as a Subchapter S corporation and other tax advantages,
to restrict transfer to certain designated persons or classes of designated
persons as long as the designation is manifestly unreasonable, and to ef-
fect other lawful restrictions on transfer or registration.333 While presum-
ably implicit under Delaware law under the "other lawful" restriction
clause, Texas expressly permits restrictions on transfers that may be nec-
essary to prevent violations of federal or state laws (such as laws restrict-
ing foreign ownership). 334
5. Certificated and Uncertificated Shares
Both Texas and Delaware law provide for the use of both certificated
and uncertificated shares.335
E. DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
1. General
The provisions under Texas and Delaware law governing dividends and
distributions are similar in many respects in that they both use the con-
cept of surplus to determine the availability of funds from which a corpo-
ration may declare a lawful dividend or distribution.336 However, the
TBCA and the DGCL differ in their approach toward dividends and dis-
tributions in many respects, with the principal distinctions being (i) their
means for permitting directors to determine surplus, (ii) Texas' require-
ment that no distribution may be made if the corporation is insolvent or
would be rendered insolvent by the distribution, (iii) Delaware's nimble
dividend provision, which permits corporations to pay dividends from
earnings even if there is no surplus, (iv) Delaware's treatment of
purchases and acquisitions of stock in a different manner than dividends,
and (v) the date for determining surplus in the case of a purchase or re-
demption of shares.
332. Huff, Choice of State of Incorporation, supra note 3.
333. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 2.22 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1991).
334. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.22(D)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
335. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.19 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 158 (1991).
336. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.38 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1991).
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2. Surplus
"Surplus" is defined under both Texas and Delaware law to be the net
assets of the corporation less the total stated value or stated capital of its
issued shares. 337 The means by which a board of directors may calculate
surplus, however, is more specific and somewhat more expansive under
Texas law than it is under Delaware law. In this regard, Article 2.38-3 of
the TBCA expressly permits a board of directors to determine a corpora-
tion's surplus and solvency based on (i) the corporation's consolidated
financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles, (ii) the corporation's financial statements for tax pur-
poses, (iii) a fair valuation of assets and liabilities of the corporation and
(iv) any other information that is considered reasonable under the
circumstances.
Texas and Delaware also both permit a director, in determining the
surplus of a corporation, to rely on any information, opinion, or state-
ment, including financial statements and other financial data, concerning
the corporation or any other person, as prepared by one or more officers
or employees of the corporation, legal counsel, public accountants, in-
vestment bankers or other persons as to matters the director reasonably
believes are within that person's professional or expert competence, or a
committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a mem-
ber. The DGCL does not expressly permit director reliance on financial
statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles or fair value appraisals in calculating surplus. A director may
consider these items if prepared by an expert that was chosen with rea-
sonable care.
3. Solvency Requirement
In addition to a requirement that a corporation have surplus in order to
pay a distribution, the TBCA provides that no distribution may be paid
by a corporation if, after giving effect to the distribution, the corporation
would be insolvent.338 Insolvency is defined in TBCA art. 1.02 section
A(16) to mean the inability of the corporation to pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of its business. Delaware has no solvency
test for distributions. However, under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, a distribution by an insolvent company may be set aside as a fraudu-
lent transfer. The incorporation of an insolvency test in Texas is merely a
codification of this concept in the TBCA.
4. Nimble Dividends
Under Delaware law, a corporation that does not have available sur-
plus to pay a dividend may nevertheless pay a dividend out of its stated
337. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 1.02(A)(27) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (1991).
338. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.38(B)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
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capital if the corporation has net profits for the fiscal year in which the
dividend is declared or in the preceding fiscal year. 339 This provision is
not available when the dividend would result in the net assets of the cor-
poration being less than the aggregate amount of capital represented by
the issued and outstanding stock of all classes that have preference upon
the distribution of assets.340 Texas does not have a similar provision.
5. Share Purchases
Under Texas law, a purchase, redemption or other acquisition by a cor-
poration of its own shares is considered a distribution and is therefore
subject to the same surplus and solvency requirements applicable to the
payment of dividends. 341 Purchases and redemptions of stock under Del-
aware law are treated somewhat differently under the DGCL than divi-
dends. Under § 160(a) of the DGCL, a corporation may not purchase or
redeem its own shares for cash or other property when the capital of the
corporation is "impaired" or where the purchase or redemption would
cause an impairment of the capital of the corporation.342 Impairment of
capital is not defined under the DGCL, but has been construed by the
courts to generally mean a reduction of the amount of assets of the corpo-
ration below the amount represented by the aggregate outstanding shares
of the corporation. 343 Thus, this provision essentially permits a corpora-
tion to purchase its shares only if there is available surplus. The DGCL
also prohibits a corporation from purchasing shares that are redeemable
at the option of the corporation for a price greater than that at which they
may then be redeemed.344
Both Texas and Delaware law provide that where a corporation has
purchased its own shares through the use of indebtedness or a deferred
payment obligation, the date for the determination of the availability of
surplus will be the date that the indebtedness or obligation is incurred
rather than on each date on which the payment obligations are due. 345
This provision is intended to provide certainty as to the enforceability of
such obligations.
Texas law also provides that where a corporation purchases, redeems,
exchanges or otherwise acquires its own shares, the determination of sur-
plus may, at the election of the corporation, be either the date on which
the obligation to redeem, exchange, purchase or otherwise acquire is
made or on the date the shares are to be redeemed, exchanged, pur-
chased or acquired. 346 This provision conforms the manner in which the
339. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (Supp. 1998).
340. Id.
341. TEX. Bus, CORP. AcT ANN. art. 1.02(A)(13)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
342. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(1) (Supp. 1998).
343. See In re Int'l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 256 (Del. Ch. 1914); Acker v. Girard Trust
Co., 42 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1930).
344. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(2) (1991).
345. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.38-4(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(1) (1991).
346. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.38-4(B) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
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availability of surplus is determined for contractual redemptions, ex-
changes, purchases or acquisitions of shares to that used for purchases of
shares in which a debt obligation is incurred. 347 Delaware does not have
a similar provision.
6. Date for Determination of Surplus
Under Texas law, the date for determination of surplus and solvency
for the payment of a lawful distribution that is not a redemption, ex-
change, purchase or acquisition of shares will generally be the date of the
authorization of the distribution. However, if the distribution is to occur
more than 120 days after the authorization, the date for the determina-
tion of surplus and solvency will be the date of the distribution unless a
date within 120 days prior to the distribution is designated by the board
of directors for the date on which the determination is to be made. 348
The purpose of establishing a date on which surplus and solvency is to be
determined under the TBCA is to provide greater certainty with respect
to the legality of distributions. Without this provision, questions could
arise as to the legality of a distribution due to changes in circumstances
between the date of declaration and payment and the inherent difficulty
in confirming solvency and surplus on a current basis as of any given date.
Delaware does not have a similar provision.
7. Director Liability for Unlawful Distributions
Article 2.41(C) of the TBCA provides that a director will have no lia-
bility for approving a distribution based on a calculation of surplus and a
determination of solvency using such indices of value and solvency as per-
mitted by Article 2.38-3 described above, if he did so in good faith and
with ordinary care, or if in good faith and with ordinary care he consid-
ered the assets of the corporation to have a value equal to at least their
value.349 A director will not be deemed to have relied in good faith on
such information if the director has knowledge concerning the matter
that makes reliance otherwise permitted unwarranted. 350
Under § 174 of the DGCL, a director will be jointly and severally liable
for the authorization and payment of an unlawful dividend if he voted for
the dividend or failed to dissent from the declaration of the dividend im-
mediately after he has notice of the same.351 However, § 172 of the
DGCL provides that a member of a board of directors will be fully pro-
tected in relying in good faith on the records of the corporation and on
such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corpo-
ration by any of its officers or employees, or any committee of the board
of directors, or of any other person as to matters the director reasonably
347. See id.
348. Id. art. 2.38-4(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
349. Id. art. 2.41(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
350. Id. art. 2.41(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
351. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (Supp. 1998).
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believes are within that person's professional expert competence and who
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation
as to the value and amount of the corporation's assets, liabilities or net
profits or any other facts pertinent to the existence or amount of surplus
or other funds from which dividends might be promptly declared or paid
or from which the corporation may promptly purchase or redeem its own
stock.352
F. SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS
The TBCA has since 1981 permitted a corporation to elect to be a close
corporation and to modify its internal affairs by agreement. To qualify as
a close corporation, the corporation and its shareholders had to make
various elections and filings with the Secretary of State of Texas. Follow-
ing the lead of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the TBCA
was amended in 1997 to extend the flexibility of a closed corporation to
all corporations that are not publicly traded through the addition of a
new Article 2.30-1.
Article 2.30-1 provides for broad-based and flexible shareholders'
agreements that modify and override the mandatory provisions of the
TBCA relating to a corporation's operations and internal affairs. An
agreement under Article 2.30-1 must be approved by all shareholders and
incorporated in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws or in
an agreement signed by all shareholders and made known to the corpora-
tion.353 Once adopted, the provisions of the shareholders' agreement will
override the general provisions of the TBCA relating to the matters pro-
vided for under the agreement.
A shareholders' agreement under Article 2.30-1 may provide for any
one or more of the following:
(1) restrict the discretion or powers of the board of directors;
(2) eliminate the board of directors and permit management of the
business and affairs of the corporation by its shareholders;
(3) establish the natural persons who shall be the directors or of-
ficers of the corporation, their term of office or manner of selection
or removal, or terms or conditions of employment of any director,
officer or other employee of the corporation, regardless of the length
of employment;
(4) govern the authorization or making of distributions whether or
not in proportion to ownership of shares, subject to the limitations in
Article 2.38 of the TBCA, or determine the manner in which profits
and losses shall be apportioned;
(5) govern, in general or in regard to specific matters, the exercise or
division of voting power by and between the shareholders, directors
(if any), or other persons or by or among any of them, including use
of disproportionate voting rights or director proxies;
352. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 172 (1987).
353. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.30-1 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
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(6) establish the terms and conditions of any agreement for the
transfer or use of property or the provision of services between the
corporation and any shareholder, director, officer or employee of the
corporation, or other person or among any of them;
(7) authorize arbitration or grant authority to any shareholder or
other person as to any issue about which there is a deadlock among
the directors, shareholders or other person or persons empowered to
manage the corporation to resolve that issue;
(8) require dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or
more of the shareholders or upon the occurrence of a specified event
or contingency in which case the dissolution of the corporation shall
proceed as if all the shareholders had consented in writing to dissolu-
tion of the corporation as provided in Article 6.02 of the TBCA; or
(9) otherwise govern the exercise of corporate powers or the man-
agement of the business and affairs of the corporation or the rela-
tionship among the shareholders, the directors and the corporation,
or among any of them, as if the corporation were a partnership or in
a manner that would otherwise be appropriate only among partners,
and is not contrary to public policy.
Shares of an electing corporation must contain a conspicuous notation
on the certificates representing the shares or on the information state-
ment required for uncertificated shares.354 A purchaser who acquires
shares of an electing corporation without actual or deemed knowledge of
the agreement will have a right of rescission for 90 days after obtaining
that knowledge. 355 An agreement permitted under Article 2.30-1 will
cease to be effective when shares of the corporation become listed on a
national securities exchange, quoted on an interdealer quotation system
of a national securities association or regularly traded in a market main-
tained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities
association.356
An agreement authorized under Article 2.30-1 that limits the discretion
or powers of the board of directors or supplants the board of directors
will relieve the directors of, and impose upon the person or person in
whom such discretion or powers or management of the business and af-
fairs of the corporation are vested, liability for action or omissions im-
posed by the TBCA or other law on directors to the extent that the
discretion or powers of the directors are limited or supplanted by the
agreement. 357
Article 2.30-1 is of substantial benefit to both privately held companies
that wish to have maximum flexibility in dealing with the management of
their corporations and larger public corporations who wish to have flexi-
bility in operating and running their subsidiaries. Examples of this en-
hanced flexibility include:
354. Id. art. 2.30-1(C).
355. Id. art. 2.30-1(D).
356. Id. art. 2.30-1(E).
357. Id. art. 2.30-1(F).
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(i) The use of corporate entities serving the same role as directors by
providing director powers to the corporate entity shareholders;
(ii) Allocation of votes among directors without creating multiple
classes of shares;
(iii) Providing for director proxies;
(iv) Providing for disproportionate or different dividends and
distributions;
(v) Providing for extended terms for directors and appointment of
new directors by existing director or shareholder groups;
(vi) Modifying mandatory voting requirements or establishing or re-
ducing rights of shareholders beyond those otherwise permitted by
the TBCA; and
(vii) Modifying, establishing or eliminating the duties (including fi-
duciary duties) of directors, officers and shareholders.
The existence or performance of an agreement authorized by Arti-
cle 2.30-1 of the TBCA will not be grounds for imposing personal liability
on any shareholder for the acts or obligations of the corporation by disre-
garding the separate entity of the corporation or otherwise, even if the
agreement or its performance treats the corporation as if it were a part-
nership or in a manner that otherwise is appropriate only among part-
ners, results in the corporation being considered a partnership for
purposes of taxation or results in failure to observe the corporate formali-
ties otherwise applicable to the matters governed by the agreement.358
As a result, Article 2.30-1 of the TBCA provides protection beyond Arti-
cle 2.21 of the TBCA on shareholder liability.
Delaware also permits shareholder agreements, but does not permit
the agreements to be modified by agreement of all stockholders the man-
agement and statutory rights and provisions of the DGCL.359
G. DISSOLUTIONS
1. General
Both Texas and Delaware law provide procedures for the liquidation
and dissolution of corporations. The procedures available in Texas, how-
ever, provide for a more streamlined and simple method for resolving
and satisfying claims on liquidation than that which is provided in Dela-
ware. Texas also treats contingent claims as of the date of dissolution
substantially different than Delaware.
2. Dissolutions under Texas Law
In Texas, a corporation begins the process of dissolution of action by its
board of directors, which is then followed by approval of the holders of at
least two-thirds of the corporation's outstanding shares.360 As is the case
for other fundamental transactions, the required vote may be reduced to
358. Id. art. 2.30-1(G).
359. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (Supp. 1998).
360. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 6.03 (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
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the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the outstanding
shares.361 Once a corporation's shareholders have approved the dissolu-
tion of the corporation, the corporation begins to proceed to collect on its
assets, dispose of its properties that are not to be distributed in kind to its
shareholders, and pay, satisfy and discharge all of its debts, liabilities and
obligations, or make adequate provision for such payment. 362
To the extent that the property and assets of the corporation are not
sufficient to pay all of the corporation's debts, liabilities and obligations,
the corporation is required to apply its assets as far as they will go to the
just and equitable payment and satisfaction of those debts, liabilities and
obligations. 363 Once the corporation has paid, satisfied or discharged all
of its debts, liabilities and obligations, or made adequate provision for the
same, the remainder of the corporation's properties and assets, either in
cash or in kind, are to be distributed to shareholders in accordance with
their respective interests. The corporation must then proceed to file arti-
cles of dissolution.
In considering the amount and timing of distributions to shareholders
in a dissolution, the TBCA permits the board of directors of a dissolving
Texas corporation to expressly consider the creditworthiness of any party
that agrees to assume the liabilities of the corporation for purposes of
determining whether the obligations of the corporation have been "ade-
quately provided for" prior to making a distribution to shareholders in
liquidation.364 In so doing, a board of directors of a corporation is enti-
tled to rely on financial and other information of the assuming
corporation.365
Once a corporation has filed articles of dissolution in Texas, the corpo-
ration will continue in existence for a period of three years for the pur-
pose of prosecuting and defending any remaining actions and holding
title and liquidating its properties. 366 If any proceedings are continuing at
the end of the three year period, the corporation will continue in exis-
tence for purposes of completing that proceeding and finalizing its distri-
butions to creditors and shareholders. During the period following the
filing of articles of dissolution and the completion of the dissolution, the
members of the board of directors will continue to manage the corpora-
tion and will have the same duties, liabilities and protections that they
had prior to the dissolution.367
Once articles of dissolution have been filed, the corporation will no
longer be liable for any claims, other than claims that existed as of the
time of the dissolution.368 An existing claim is defined in Article 7.12 to
361. Id. art. 2.28.
362. Id. art. 6.04(A)(3).
363. Id.
364. See id. arts. 2.38-3, 2.41, 6.04.
365. Id. art. 2.41(C), (D).
366. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 7.12A(A) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
367. Id. art. 7.12(B).
368. Id. art. 7.12(C).
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be (i) a right of payment, damages or property, whether liquidated or
unliquidated, accrued or contingent, matured or unmatured, that existed
before the dissolution and is not otherwise barred by limitations and (ii) a
contractual obligation incurred after dissolution.369 A personal injury
claim occurring after dissolution is not an existing claim. 370 Any claim
that existed as of the time of the dissolution will be extinguished unless an
action or proceeding is brought within three years following the date of
dissolution. 371 The foregoing provisions represent an express bar to the
common law trust fund theory.372
A corporation may expedite the three-year time period for resolving
existing claims by giving written notice to persons having or asserting any
existing claims against the corporation.373 Such a notice must advise the
person of when a claim must be presented (which date may not be less
than 120 days after the date of the notice) and that a failure to make a
notice within the required time period will result in extinguishment of
that party's claim. 374 This notice must be accompanied with a copy of the
applicable provisions of the TBCA relating to the extinguishment of
claims in dissolution. 375 The corporation will be entitled to object to any
claims that are made to it in response to its notice by providing written
notice of such objection to the claimant. A disputed claim of a claimant
will be extinguished under the TBCA following the notice unless an ac-
tion is brought by the claimant against the corporation within 180 days
after the notice of rejection or before the expiration of the three-year
period following the date of dissolution.376
3. Dissolutions Under Delaware Law
In Delaware, the liquidation and dissolution of a corporation begins
with approval of a plan of dissolution by the board of directors and re-
quires the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares of the corpo-
ration entitled to vote on the dissolution.377 Upon approval of the
dissolution, the corporation files a certificate of dissolution and proceeds
to settle and close the business of the corporation, dispose of and convey
the corporation's property, discharge the corporation's liabilities, and dis-
tribute the remaining assets to the corporation's shareholders. 378
As in Texas, any action, suit or proceeding begun by or against the
corporation prior to the dissolution or within three years after filing of
369. Id. art. 7.12(F)(2), (3).
370. Id.; see also Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 549-500 (Tex.
1981); Weibel v. Martin Indus., Inc., 806 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no
writ).
371. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 7.12(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
372. See Hunter, 620 S.W.2d at 550.




377. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(a), (b) (1991).
378. Id. tit. 8, § 278.
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articles of dissolution, may be commenced. 379 However, unlike in Texas,
proceedings brought against the corporation will not be limited to claims
that existed on the date of the filing of the articles of dissolution. Rather,
they will extend to claims that occur subsequent to the filing as well as
contingent unknown claims that are "likely to arise or to become known
to the corporation or successor entity ... prior to the expiration of appli-
cable statutes of limitations. ' '380 Thus, in regard to future contingent lia-
bilities, the range of potential liabilities to be resolved during the
liquidation and dissolution process is substantially broader under Dela-
ware law than it is under Texas law.
Like the TBCA, the DGCL also sets forth an expedited procedure for
resolving claims against a corporation during the dissolution process.
Under section 280 of the DGCL, a corporation may elect to follow a pro-
cedure in which all claimants are advised of the dissolution by mail and
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in a county in which the
corporation's office is located, and in the case of the corporation having
more than $10,000,000 in total assets, at least once in all editions of a
daily newspaper with national circulation. 381 Under this procedure, the
corporation may require that claims be submitted to it within sixty days
after providing the notice and that any actions be filed in respect to dis-
puted claims within ninety days after notice of a rejection of the claim.382
The notice provisions under section 280 of the DGCL must be given to
all persons having claims, as well as all persons with contractual claims
contingent upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of future events. 383
Notice to persons who have contingent claims that are not contractual in
nature, which the DGCL defines to include persons with possible war-
ranty and product liability claims, need not be provided notice under the
statute.384 Section 280 also establishes a procedure by which the Court of
Chancery may determine the amount and form of security reasonably
likely to be sufficient to provide compensation for claims that are not
known to the corporation or that have not arisen or are likely to arise or
to become known to the corporation or successor entity prior to the expi-
ration of applicable statutes of limitations. 385 The Court of Chancery
may also appoint a guardian ad litem in respect of any proceeding
brought under this provision.386
A corporation not electing to follow the procedures set forth in sec-
tion 280 must pay or make reasonable provision for the payment of all
claims and obligations, including all contingent, conditional and unma-
tured contractual claims known to the corporation or any successor en-
379. Id.
380. Id. §§ 280(c)(2), 281(b).
381. Id. § 280(a)(1)(f).
382. See id. at (a)(1), (3).
383. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 280(a)(1), (b)(2) (1991).
384. See id. § 280(b)(1).
385. See id. § 280(c)(1)-(3).
386. See id. § 280(c)(3).
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tity. The corporation must make provision as will be reasonably likely or
sufficient to provide compensation for claims that are not known or that
have not arisen but based on facts known to the corporation are likely to
arise in the future prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations.387
4. Derivative Lawsuits
In Delaware, there has developed a substantial body of case law relat-
ing to shareholder demand requirements and the interplay between the
business judgment rule and the right of a corporation to dismiss a deriva-
tive lawsuit for not being in the interest of the corporation. This case law
resulted in somewhat confusing and contrary decisions involving concepts
such as what is sufficient demand, when is demand excused, and the role
of the court in reviewing the business judgment of a board of directors or
committee that is charged with reviewing a particular claim.
Article 5.14 of the TBCA relating to derivative lawsuits was amended
in 1997 to provide a rule for the review and handling of shareholder de-
rivative lawsuits. The amendments establish clear procedures for the re-
view of derivative lawsuits while attempting to maintain a balance
between the right of a shareholder to pursue a corporate action that has
not been properly considered by the corporation's board while giving def-
erence to the business decisions and judgments made by a disinterested
and independent committee of a board of directors with respect to the
advisability of pursuing such a claim.388
Article 5.14 establishes a universal demand requirement without any
"demand excused" exception. 389 As a result, the statute requires that
under all circumstances a shareholder to make a demand on the corpora-
tion before the shareholder may proceed with an action in the name of
the corporation.390 This absolute demand requirement is intended to
provide greater certainty to both the corporation and the shareholder by
eliminating the procedural trap for shareholders that often exists in deriv-
ative proceedings. A shareholder's failure to make a demand will result
in a dismissal of the shareholder's lawsuit. The demand by the share-
holder must be in writing and set forth with particularity the act, omis-
sion, or other matter that is the subject of the claim or challenge and
request that the corporation take suitable action.391 The corporation will
then have ninety days to review the matter. During this review period,
the shareholder may not file an action unless the shareholder is notified
that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irrepara-
ble injury to the corporation is being suffered or would result by waiting
for the expiration of the ninety-day period.392 A written demand filed
387. See id. § 281(b).
388. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14 (West. Supp. 2000).
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with the corporation by a shareholder will toll the statute of limitations
on the claim upon which demand is made until the earlier of ninety days
and thirty days after the corporation advises the shareholder that the de-
mand has been rejected or the review has been completed.393
A shareholder whose demand has been rejected or not acted upon
within ninety days of notice may file a derivative suit with respect to the
matter. A shareholder, however, may not commence or maintain a deriv-
ative proceeding unless the shareholder was a shareholder of the corpora-
tion at the time of the act or omission complained of or became a
shareholder by operation of law from a person that was shareholder at
that time. The shareholder must also fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation.394 If
a derivative proceeding is commenced after a demand is rejected or the
90-day review period expires, the petition must allege with particularity
facts that establish that the rejection was not made in accordance with the
requirements of statute. 395
If following the receipt of a demand by a shareholder, the corporation
commences an inquiry into the allegations made in a demand and con-
ducts an active review of the allegations in good faith, the court is re-
quired to stay the "derivative proceeding until the review is completed
and a determination is made by the person or group as to what further
action, if any, should be taken. '396 To obtain a stay, the corporation
"must provide the court with a written statement containing an undertak-
ing to advise the court and the shareholder making the demand of the
determination promptly upon the completion of the review of the mat-
ter. ' '397 A stay may "be reviewed as to its continued necessity every
sixty days thereafter. '398 If the review and determination relating thereto
is not completed within sixty days, the stay may be renewed for one or
more additional sixty day periods upon the "corporation providing the
court and the shareholder making the demand with a written statement of
the status of the review and the reasons a continued extension of the stay
is necessary. '399 The extension of the stay, however, is not automatic and
is dependent on the court's determination that the review process is being
actively pursued in good faith.
A corporation may seek a dismissal of a derivative proceeding that is
filed on the grounds that it is not in the interest of the corporation to
pursue. A court will be required to dismiss the proceeding on this basis if
(i) a majority of the independent and disinterested directors of the corpo-
ration constituting a quorum of the whole board; (ii) a committee of the
board consisting of two or more independent and disinterested directors;
393. See TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.14(E) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
394. Id. art. 5.14(B).
395. See id. art. 5.14(G).






or (iii) one or more persons who are independent and disinterested and
appointed by the court at the recommendation of the corporation deter-
mine in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry and based on
the factors as the person or group deems appropriate under the circum-
stances, that the continuation of the derivative proceeding is not in the
best interests of the corporation. 400 The court may not second-guess the
business judgment of the reviewing body nor engage in a review of the
substantive claims proposed to be pursued by the shareholder. Rather,
the court's review is limited to a review of the good-faith review of the
board, committee, or panel and the disinterest and independence of such
persons.
If a corporation seeks to have the review of the desirability of pursuing
a proceeding delegated to one or more independent and disinterested
persons appointed by the court, the persons must be appointed by the
court upon a motion by the corporation setting forth the names of the
persons to be appointed together with a statement that to the best of the
corporation's knowledge the persons proposed are disinterested persons
and are qualified to make the determinations contemplated by the stat-
ute.401 A shareholder may not propose a reviewing panel or members of
the reviewing panel, nor may the court make such a proposal itself. The
court, however, need not appoint the persons proposed by the corpora-
tion if the court finds that those persons are not independent and disin-
terested persons or are otherwise not qualified in regard to expertise,
experience, independent judgment and other factors deemed appropriate
by the court under the circumstances to make such determinations. "Per-
sons appointed by the court will have no liability to the corporation or its
shareholders for any action or omission taken by them in that capacity
absent fraud or willful misconduct. '402
In determining whether the requirements for dismissal have been met,
the initial burden of proof will be on the shareholder "if a majority of the
board of directors consists of independent and disinterested directors at
the time the determination is made" or if the determination is made by a
panel of one or more independent and disinterested persons appointed
by the court in accordance with the statute.4 0 3 The initial burden of proof
will be on the corporation in all other circumstances. 4°4 If the corpora-
tion presents prima facia evidence that demonstrates that the directors or
the members of the special review committee are independent and disin-
terested, the burden of proof will shift back to the shareholder. 40 5
Pending a judicial determination whether a derivative proceeding may
be pursued by a shareholder and after the expiration of the stay period,
discovery by the shareholder will be limited to facts relating to whether
400. See id. art. 5.14(F), (H).
401. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.15(H) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
402. Id.
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the person or group undertaking the review in accordance with the
statute:
is independent and disinterested, the good faith of the inquiry and
review by such person or group, and the reasonableness of the proce-
dures followed by such person or group in conducting its review and
will not extend to any facts or substantive matters with respect to the
act, omission, or other matter that is the subject matter of the action
in the derivative proceeding.40 6
The scope of discovery may be expanded if the court determines after
notice and hearing that a good faith review of the allegations has not
been made by an independent and disinterested person or group in accor-
dance with the statute.40 7
On termination of a derivative proceeding, the court may order the
corporation to pay the plaintiff's expenses incurred in the proceeding if it
finds that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the cor-
poration.40 8 The court may also order the shareholder "to pay the ex-
penses of the corporation or any defendant incurred in investigating and
defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was commenced
or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose. ''409
In addition, the statute provides the courts with the authority to order a
party to pay the expenses incurred by another party (including the
corporation):
because of the filing of a pleading, motion or other paper, if it finds
that the pleading, motion or other paper (i) was not well grounded in
fact after reasonable inquiry, (ii) was not warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law or (iii) was interposed for an improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.410
Article 5.14 applies principally to corporations organized under Texas
law and is intended to relate to the substantive internal affairs of the cor-
poration, and therefore applies to cases brought both in and outside of
Texas.411 As such, article 5.14 supplants and overrides, to the extent in-
consistent, any judicial rules of procedure governing derivative proceed-
ings, including Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 42(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the proce-
dural provisions relating to stays, discovery and expenses will also apply
to derivative proceedings in the Texas courts involving foreign
corporations.
Central to the operation of article 5.14 are new definitions of "indepen-
dent" and "disinterested" in article 1.02 of the TBCA. A person will be
406. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac'r ANN. art. 5.14(D)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
407. See id.
408. See id. art. 5.14(J)(1)(a).
409. Id. art 5.14(J)(1)(b).
410. Id. art 5.14(J)(1)(c).
411. See id. art. 5.14(K).
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considered "independent" for purposes of article 5.14, if for purposes of
considering the disposition of a claim or challenge, the person: (i) is disin-
terested, (ii) is not an associate or member of the immediate family of a
party to the contract or transaction, (iii) does not, nor does any associate
or member of such person's immediate family, have a business, financial
or familial relationship with a party to the contract or transaction; and
(iv) is not otherwise shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be
under the controlling influence of a party to the contract or transaction
subject to challenge or that is alleged to have engaged in conduct that is
the subject to the claim or challenge. 412 As a result, the determination of
the compliance of the review with the statutory requirements will be a
question of fact to be determined by the court in connection with a mo-
tion to dismiss.
To eliminate a common area of dispute that has arisen in Delaware and
other jurisdictions in regard to independence, the TBCA provides that
the following factors will not in and of themselves result in a person not
being considered independent:
(i) the person was nominated as a director by the person against
whom the action relates;
(ii) the person receives normal director's fees or similar customary
compensation and benefits as a director;
(iii) the person has a direct or indirect ownership interest in the
corporation;
(iv) the corporation or its subsidiaries have an interest in the trans-
action or was affected by the alleged conduct;
(v) the person or an associate or affiliate receives customary and or-
dinary compensation for services rendered to engage in a review,
make recommendations or decide the disposition of the claim or
challenge; or
(vi) the person or an associate, immediate family member or affiliate
has an ongoing business relationship with the corporation that is not
material to that person, associate, family member or affiliate.413
A person will be considered "disinterested" for purposes of Arti-
cle 5.14 if the person is not a party to the contract or transaction that is
the subject of the claim or is "not materially involved in the conduct that
is subject to the claim or challenge and does not otherwise have a mate-
rial financial interest in the outcome of the contract or transaction or the
disposition of the claim or challenge. 41 4
As with the definition of "independent," a person will not be consid-
ered to have such an interest solely by reason of any one or more of the
permitted exceptions in the definition of independence or either one of
the following:
(i) the person is a named defendant in the proceeding or is a person
who is alleged to have engaged in the complained of conduct; or
412. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 1.02(A)(15) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
413. Id.
414. Id. art. 1.02(A)(12).
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(ii) the person voted for or acquiesced in, as a director, the act being
challenged if the act resulted in no material personal or financial
benefit to the person and the challenging party fails to allege with
particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect that the
person would be adjudged liable to the corporation or its sharehold-
ers by reason of that conduct; e.g., a breach of the duty of loyalty.415
H. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Bylaw Adoption and Amendments
Under Texas law, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorpo-
ration, directors are authorized to adopt and amend bylaws.416 Under
Delaware law, the initial bylaws are to be adopted by the incorporators or
initial directors and thereafter only shareholders can amend the bylaws
unless the certificate of incorporation permits the directors to do the
same.417 The right of shareholders to amend bylaws also may not be pro-
hibited under Delaware law. Under Texas law, the articles of incorpora-
tion or a bylaw adopted by shareholders may provide that the bylaws may
not be amended by shareholders. 418 This provision was adopted to ad-
dress the sometimes uncertain status of provisions in certificates of incor-
poration in Delaware that provide for supermajority votes of
stockholders to amend bylaws (e.g., is a provision that requires a 99.9%
vote of stockholders of a public company to adopt a bylaw a de facto
prohibition on the right of stockholders to adopt and amend bylaws).
2. Delayed Effectiveness
Article 10.03 of the TBCA provides that substantially all transactions
that may be effected under the TBCA may be made effective as of a time
and date after the time and date otherwise provided in the TBCA and
may be made effective upon the occurrence of events or facts that may
occur in the future, which events or facts may include future acts of any
person or entity, provided that the delayed effectiveness may not occur
more than ninety days after the filing of the articles, statement, applica-
tion or other filings required to be made with the Secretary of State.419
Further, if the effectiveness is to be based on events or facts that may
occur in the future, other than the mere passage of time, a statement of
those events or facts must be identified in an initial filing and a subse-
quent filing must be made within ninety days stating that all the events or
facts upon which the effectiveness was conditioned have been satisfied or
waived and the date on which the condition was satisfied or waived.420
415. Id.
416. See id. art. 2.23(B).
417. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991).
418. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.23(C) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
419. See id. art. 10.03(d), (A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1999-2000).
420. Id. at art. 10.03(d)(A)(3).
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Under Delaware law, an instrument or filing may be made effective at
a time subsequent to the initial filing as long as such time and date is not
greater than ninety days after the date of the initial filing.421 The DGCL
does not permit for delayed effectiveness of filings based on matters
other than the passage of time.
VI. PROPOSED TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE
Texas is proceeding forward to update all of its business organization
statutes through a new proposed Business Organizations Code (the "En-
tity Code") for Texas that has been introduced 422 in the 77th Session of
the Texas Legislature which was convened January 9, 2001. This new En-
tity Code is intended to provide maximum flexibility to organizations in
the establishment of their capital structures, effecting business combina-
tion transactions and governing their internal affairs and should become a
model for future statutes and solidifying Texas' position as a leader in
corporate law.423
The Entity Code is intended to be a substantive codification of the ex-
isting Texas statutes governing non-profit and for-profit, private-sector
entities. These statutes consist of the following: Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act, Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, Texas Miscellaneous Corpo-
ration Laws Act, Texas Limited Liability Company Act, Texas Revised
Limited Partnership Act, Texas Real Estate Investment Trust Act, Texas
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Act, Texas Professional
Corporation Act, Texas Professional Associations Act, the Texas Revised
Partnership Act, the Cooperative Associations Act and other existing
provisions of Texas statutes governing private entities.
The Entity Code is a joint project of the Business Law Section of the
State Bar of Texas, The Office of the Texas Secretary of State and the
Texas Legislative Council. 424 The Code has been under development
since 1995.425
421. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103(d) (1991).
422. Tex. H.B. 327 77th Leg., R.S. (2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/
77r/billtext/HB00327I.HTM (Rep. Fred Bosse).
423. See Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles
of Object Oriented Analysis to Legislative Drafting, 3 NYU J. of Legis. and Pub. Pol'y 227,
249-257 (2000).
424. Ad Hoc Codification Committee of the Business Law Section, Report of the Codi-
fication Committee of the Section of Business Law of the State Bar of Texas on the Proposed
Business Organizations Code. The Bar Committee was primarily responsible for drafting
the Code in collaboration with the Office of the Texas Secretary of State and the Texas
Legislative Council.
425. A version of the Entity Code was introduced on March 9, 1999 in the 76th Texas
Legislative Session as House Bill 2681 by Rep. Fred Bosse. The bill was heard by and
reported favorably out of the Business & Industry Committee, but was never set on the
House Calendar during the 76th Legislative Session. For information regarding the bill as
introduced in 1999, see http://www.texasbusinesslaw.org/1999code/originalprelimrpt.html.
In preparing for the 77th Legislative Session, the Bar Committee worked with the Texas
Secretary of State and the Legislative Council in preparing the form of Entity Code intro-
duced on December 5, 2000 as House Bill 327.
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The Texas Legislative Council is required by law426 to revise and reor-
ganize statutes into codes. The codification process involves reclassifying
and rearranging the statutes in a more logical order, emphasizing a num-
bering system and format that will accommodate future expansion of the
law, eliminating repealed, invalid, duplicative and other ineffective provi-
sions, and improving the draftsmanship of the law if practicable. These
efforts are carried out to make the statutes more accessible, understanda-
ble and useable.
The proposed Entity Code adopts a "hub and spoke" organizational
approach under which provisions common to all entities are included in a
central "hub" of the Entity Code found in Title 1. These common provi-
sions are collected in and include the provisions governing (i) indemnifi-
cation of directors and partners, (ii) mergers among entities and (iii)
purposes and powers of entities. Outside Title 1, separate "spokes" con-
tain provisions governing different types of entities which are not com-
mon or similar among the different entities.
In the codification process, the Legislative Council's mandate is not to
make any substantive revisions to the Texas statutes. As a result, the
principles of Texas law discussed above will be carried forward into the
Entity Code.
VII. CONCLUSION
As is evident from the above discussion, the TBCA has evolved over
the last decade into one of the most modern, flexible, and progressive
corporation law statutes in the country. As such, it is on par with the
DGCL and, in many areas, provides corporations with greater flexibility,
options, and alternatives than are available to corporations under Dela-
ware law.
The choice of jurisdiction of incorporation, however, is not always a
simple one and cannot be based solely on the corporation laws of the
proposed state of incorporation. The decision must also take into ac-
count factors such as franchise taxes and other financial and business con-
cerns. Often while one state's corporation laws may be more desirable
than another state's, the choice of jurisdiction of incorporation will be
mandated by these other items. Where non-financial or business con-
cerns do not require a different decision, practitioners should seriously
consider Texas as a potentially more desirable alternative to Delaware
when making the incorporation decision.
426. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 323.007 (West 2001).
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